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ABSTRACT

The Chemging Face of the KGB examines the contemporary
structure and functions of the post-Soviet Russian security
emd intelligence services.

The nature of the relationships

of the domestic and foreign intelligence services to other
power structures in Russia today are exeunined, including an
evaluation of its espionage networks within Russia, Eastern
Europe, and the "near abroad."

Special attention is devoted

to an analysis of the Russian foreign intelligence service's
recruiting methods and the cases of Russian spies Aldrich
Ames, Harold Nicholson, and Earl Pitts.

Finally, the thesis

excimines the Russian intelligence services' resumption of
training terrorists, particularly those affiliated with
Iran.
The purpose of this thesis, then, is to provide an
understanding of the post-Soviet Russian political-economic
system and the extent of the Yeltsin Administration's
progress in instituting democratic reforms, which have been
thwarted by the continued legacy that is the KGB.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Despite the fact that the KGB has become a household
term in America and Russia, it is surprising how much
confusion exists over what it is, how it is orgemized, and
what it does.

The confusion, in many ways, is a logical and

consistent one in that the organization itself has
historically undergone rapid and major changes from its
earliest inception in the hands of "Iron Felix" Dzerzhinsky
to its present state.

The secret police agency has changed

faces with the changing face of the Russian political
system.

Yet, it was and is a force to be reckoned with.

Known for the terror it produced during the Stalinist
and Khrushchev eras, the typical Russian today still reacts
with a symbolic apprehension when the term KGB is used.
Yet, for all these changes there is still a confusion as to
exactly what the orgzmization was in the past and more so a
complete lack of understanding and clarity as to what the
organization consists of and its duties and powers are at
the present time.

Considering the role that Russia is

playing in international politics today, it is a vital
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aspect of contemporzury knowledge in political science and in
criminal justice to have clarity on this issue.
In order to clarify this issue, it is necessary to have
a historical, political, zmd social understanding of this
organization and its role in past Russia.

For the history

of Russia has been a simultzmeous history with that of the
KGB.

Indeed, one can make the point that to understand the

role of the KGB in the changing forces of Russian
contemporary history is to better understand Soviet-Russ ian
society today.
When in 1991 Soviet-style communism collapsed
throughout the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc states of
Eastern Europe, the geopolitical map of the world changed
significantly.

The immediate consequences of communism's

demise were the gaining of independence from Moscow of the
fifteen former Soviet republics.

Additionally, the peoples

of the Eastern European states gained the freedom to change
their political systems.

As many of these countries

discarded their old communist political systems for
democratic ones, the role of the secret police and, further,
its very nature, changed dreunatically.

Thus, "democratic"

changes are much more evident within the former Soviet bloc
countries of Eastern Europe and the Baltics them in the
Former Soviet Union (FSU) itself.
Structurally, within the new Russian Federation, the
KGB was broken down into several, smaller entities, which
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were renamed.

The governments of the Russian republics

created "independent" republic RGBs.

And new state security

services were created in the Eastern European states.

Neuiy

changes within the state security and intelligence services
of the countries within the former Soviet sphere of
influence took place and reflected the reform process that
was concurrently occurring within each particular state or
republic.
Hence, the main emphasis of this thesis will be on the
current role of the KGB's successor agencies.

The study

will focus on the intelligence services of the Russian
Federation specifically, but will also examine the state of
the new security and intelligence agencies of the former
Soviet republics and the Eastern European countries, where
KGB surrogate intelligence apparatuses and espionage
networks had been developed and served as loyal instruments
under Moscow's control during the Soviet era.
Since the (Russian) secret police retain their primacy
in Russizm politics, their relationship to contemporary
Russian society and government is studied.

Equally

important, the continuing work of the contemporary KGB as an
espionage service is exzuained and evaluated in detail,
including a discussion of its spy networks.

In this respect

then, this work is historical, political, and social in its
scope.
Because of the nature of this project, the review of
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the literature in some cases coincided with the review of
the sources necessary to the study itself.

However, as

every thesis requires as part of its methodological
procedure a review of the literature, I here make a
distinction.

The purpose of the review was concentrated

primarily in searching for works that had already dealt with
the issue being studied.

For example, I reviewed any

sources that have attempted to explain and study the role of
the KGB historically and contemporarily as it related to the
history of the Soviet Union zmd contemporary Russia.

Once

again, I emphasize that here my purpose was that of
examining to what extent the topic had already been
excimined.
Obviously, since this work is historical, political and
social in nature, it required an examination of those
secondary historical, political, and social works concerning
the birth and development of the KGB.

Hence, I searched for

the history of its development and a political-social
understanding of its role in Soviet society.

Further,

current works were exeunined; the primary sources that I
utilized included both American and Russian newspapers,
periodicals, government documents, conference papers,
monographs, media broadcasts, and the Internet.
Further, I conducted interviews in the United States
with Russian nationals that both live in America, and that
reside in Russia but were visiting the U.S..

I used an
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open-ended guided interview schedule, which allowed more
information to be made available in the interviews.

The

interviews were then zmalyzed and interpreted in terms of
the data as it related to the clarification of the problem.
These interviews were necessary since, in light of the
state of confusion within law enforcement structures in
Russia today and, moreover, the large gap in the literature
available today on the current and mere recent state of the
Russian intelligence services, they provided a more accurate
picture of the KGB's current role within and its
relationships to contemporary Russian society and
government.

Further, these interviews provided me insight

into the internal workings of the past KGB, its operations
and methods, which shed light and gave clearer meaning to
its current methods of operations.

Furthermore, these

interviews illuminated the contemporary relationships
between the Center and periphery security and intelligence
apparatuses.
Drawing from these primary and secondary sources and
interviews, in Chapter 2, I present a chronological history
of the structural changes that the massive KGB underwent
from the period immediately following the August 1991 coup
attempt to the present, and which culminated in several new
security and intelligence agencies, commonly referred to as
the "KGB's successor agencies."

Their names were changed

numerous times during the early 1990s as their powers
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increased.

Moreover, with each organizational change,

Yeltsin brought the chekists more firmly under his control.
I emalyze the functional roles of these multiple agencies,
evaluate the events that led to each structural chzmge, and
examine the significance of each "new face."
In Chapter 3, I examine the linkages between the major
pillars of power in Russia today.

Indeed, the "new

oligarchy" that controls contemporary Russia consists of the
political-elite nomenklatura, orgemized crime elements, zmd
the KGB.

How each of these groups gained power in post-

Soviet Russia, specifically, the activities and events that
cemented their relationships and enzUaled them to gain
control of virtually the entire economic-social strata of
contemporary Russian society is the focus of this chapter.
In Chapter 4, I exzunine the contemporary role of
Russia's

domestic security and intelligence services.

Indeed, as communism collapsed, many KGB officers "left"
government service to start up private security services and
provide protection to the new banking, business, and
political elites, many of which maintained ties to organized
criminals.

As such, the integration of organized criminals

into the major financial structures and government of the
new Russia was facilitated.
rzunpant.

Crime and corruption became

Contract killings reached an unprecedented level.

These situations are evaluated, including the failure of the
Russian government to institute any meaningful laws to deal
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with the endemic corruption or to develop a civil society
based on the rule of law.

The chapter ends with a

discussion of the secret police's continued political
surveillance and, furthermore, its surveillance of Russian
society.
In Chapter 5, I exzunine the role of the foreign
intelligence service, the SVR.

The nature of Russian

foreign intelligence changed with communism's demise and the
subsequent loss of ideological mission.
nature is addressed.

Hence, its changed

In Russia's process of transformation

from a central economy to a "new capitalist" one, Russia's
foreign intelligence service strived to acquire economic,
proprietary, industrial, and technical information in order
to compete in the international business community on a
global basis.
As markets have become increasingly competitive, the
Russians have sought to gain market share through the
benefit of espionage.

Hence, the SVR's continuing economic

espionage offensive is studied in detail.

Moreover, the

collaboration between the "new oligarchy" members to conduct
espionage for their own personal, commercial interests and
profits, which is their root source of motivation, is
examined.
Since Russian organized criminals have developed
international ties with other "mafia" groups throughout the
world, sometimes through the manipulation and control of
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Russian emigres, the cooperation between these groups is
discussed, including an emalysis of the growing threat that
Russian orgzmized crime, working in close collaboration with
the Russian security zmd intelligence services, poses to the
United States, other industrialized countries, zmd the
international business community.
In Chapter 6, I examine the Russians' use of spies zmd
their development of espionage networks.

Special attention

is given to the recruitment methods used by the Russian
intelligence services in the contemporary world.

During the

past few years, numerous discoveries and exposures of spies
working for Moscow within the rzmks of U.S. intelligence
agencies and the FBI have illuminated the continued KGB-SVR
activity in America since the death of the Soviet Union.
The specific cases of Aldrich Ames, Harold Nicholson, and
Earl Pitts are exzumined.
The loss of ideological mission that coincided with
communism's demise, coupled with the fact that the Soviet
bloc states of Eastern Europe gained their independence from
Moscow, meant that the KGB's networks in these countries
suffered damage.

Moreover, the governments of these newly-

independent states reorganized their security zmd
intelligence services in an effort to make them independent
form Moscow and, consequently, to switch their loyalties
from Moscow to their own governments and state's national
security.

Hence, I exzunine the current state of security
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and intelligence services and their espionage networks in
these states and the barriers that the East Europezm
governments zmd societies face in their efforts to end the
repressive techniques of the secret police as they strive to
change their political-economic systems and "democratize."
Lastly, I exzunine the intelligence situation in the
"near züsroad," a region that the Yeltsin Administration, and
Russian foreign intelligence more specifically, rates as a
top priority.

The Russizm Federation's reintegration with

the Russian republics in order to regain the FSU's influence
and, further, to partake of and control the wealth of
resources contained within these former Soviet republics,
particularly the oil and gas in the Caspian Sea region, is
first on Yeltsin's foreign policy agenda.
As such, the SVR, in collzüaoration with the FSB,
Russia's domestic intelligence service, work to manipulate
and exploit the ethnic tensions in these areas in attempts
to influence events there by creating the conditions that
will enzüole them to achieve these objectives.

Toward this

end, Russia's security and intelligence services cultivate
friendly relationships with foreign intelligence services to
aid them in these endeavors.

Therefore, I examine the KGB's

successor agencies' efforts to reestzUslish relations with
the intelligence services of rogue states such as Iran
through the training of Iranian intelligence agents, and
even more ominous, the training of terrorists, many of which
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have ties with radical Islamic groups.
In Chapter 7, I conclude by pointing out the great
threat that the former KGB poses to the international
business community.

Indeed, the "new oligarchy" linkages

make this threat all the more ominous by the fact that
Russizm security and intelligence services collzdsorate
closely with ruthless orgzmized criminals and both the
chekists and the organized criminals enjoy the backing and
support of the Russian government.

As such, free capitalist

states must strive to protect their economies from being
subverted by these forces.

And they must take measures to

ensure the stzibility of their governments, too.

Until the

Russian government reins in its secret police, develops a
civil society, and institutes a rule of law built upon
democratic institutions that recognize, protect, and uphold
the dignity of human life, true democracy in Russia will not
be realized.
The KGB has undergone multiple nzune changes.

They

entail no more than simple cosmetic changes; the post-Soviet
Russian KGB continues to retain the szune methods and
operational tactics of its predecessors.

Indeed, since the

1917 Revolution to 1954 alone, Russia's secret police had
been labeled at least ten times, beginning with the "VChKa"
or "Cheka," followed by the "NKVD," the "GPU," the "OGPU,"
the "GUGB," the "NKGB," the "MGB," the "KI," the "MVD," and
the "KGB."

In addition, there has been the "INO," the
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"INÜ," "MOOP," the "KRO," the "GDKR-NKO" or "Smersh," the
”GRU," "Spetsnaz,” "Osnaz,” zmd others.

Indeed, this

extensive list does not include the numerous new agencies
that have succeeded the "KGB": the "MSB," "AFB," "KPS,"
"KOGG," "GUO," "MBVD," "MB," "TsSR," "SVR," "FAPSI," "FSK,"
"FSB," "SBP," "FSO," zmd "GSO."
Therefore, to enzüsle the reader to distinguish between
agencies, I usually refer to the agency by the specific
title it was known by at a specific moment within the
context of the time in which the particular event,
situation, or role I am discussing in each instance that it
was then known by.

For exzunple, if I zim discussing an

activity of the Russian foreign intelligence service
immediately following the August 1991 coup attempt, I will
use the Izüsel of "TsSR. "

However, when referring to the

individual KGB officer(s), or "chekist(s)," (derived from
"Cheka") as they are commonly Izibeled, whether as a member
of the KGB, SVR, or the FSB, I typically refer to them as
such.

When I zua referring to the Russian secret police

organization generally, I either use the term "KGB" or the
"security and intelligence services."

The intention here is

to enable the reader to more easily grasp the changes that
occurred within the Russian intelligence services as an
organization and Russian intelligence officers as
individuals.
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CHAPTER 2

CONTEMPORARY RUSSIAN INTELLIGENCE STRUCTURES
Contrary to Russia's claim that following the August
1991 coup attempt to reinstall hard-liners the KGB was
dismantled and "disappeared into thin air," the notorious
secret police and intelligence service continue to exist.
Any chemge in KGB techniques zmd methods have been merely
cosmetic.

Actually, many changes within Soviet-Russia had

begun tzücing place during the late 1980s and early 1990s,
before communism collapsed.

The KGB had played an active

role in the course of events, culminating in the "putsch" to
oust Gorbachev in August 1991.
Since 1987, Russian society had gained some freedom of
expression as a result of Gorbachev's "glasnost" policy.^
The Soviet people did not desire a return to the old
totalitarian system that the KGB had brutally enforced, as
demonstrated by the widespread protests in the streets
during the three days of the putsch.

Enjoying their newly-

gained freedom to spezüc out, the mass public had often
channeled its hatred and discontent toward Izunbasting the
KGB for its historically suppressive role.

Revelations of

12
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the participation of top KGB leaders in planning,
organizing, and carrying out the putsch to invoke a state of
emergency further intensified this focus of public outcry.
Animosity toward the KGB had been particularly severe
in the Baltic States, where those affiliated with the secret
police continue to be ostracized from society.^

An

observzmt member of the Popular Front for the Liberation of
Azerbaijan, A. Akhmedov, pointedly described the events
surrounding the Moscow August 1991 coup as "a continuation
of the bloody events in Baku and Vilnius."

Further,

Akhmedov related that those who died in the battles died for
the szune cause of freedom as those who perished in Moscow
during the three days of the coup attempt.^
During the late 1980s, the Baltic peoples had attacked
and seized many KGB offices and headquarters, in the process
acquiring volumes of secret police files that revealed past
crimes of the KGB.

This action was followed by various

critics and disaffected KGB staffers presenting the contents
of these files to the public.
As a result of these raids on KGB offices and the
public's acquisition of KGB files, many of the terrible
crimes the secret police had committed were exposed.

The

awakening that the Russian people experienced upon the
revelation of the contents of these files stunned them as
they began to realize the injustices they had been subjected
to and the lies they had been told for many decades by the
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communist regime and its protector the KGB, that great
"sword and shield of the party," the forces of which had
maintained total control over their tragic lives.

In short,

widespread opposition and bitter animosity and resentment
toward the KGB, along with a lack of support from many
members within the military, security, and intelligence
institutions, had contributed to the failure of the August
1991 coup attempt.
In the aftermath of communism's collapse, there was no
closing of chekist ranks as there had been during the months
preceding the August 1991 events, when security and
intelligence officers had united with ultra-nationalists to
oppose perestroika zmd the signing of the impending Union
Treaty.^

In fact, there was very little cohesion,

widespread apprehension and low morale, and, hence, much
weakness within KGB structures as many officers grappled
with the exposures of the Soviet secret police's past crimes
and their future role in the emerging non-totalitarian
Russian society.
The unraveling events within the Soviet Union had
damaged the chekists, both in terms of morale and in their
sense of purpose.

Following the failed coup attempt, the

toppling of Dzerzhinsky's statue in Dzerzhinsky Square was
televised live. ^ The KGB had not intervened.

Since 1985,

the media had played an increasingly major role in shaping
political events in Soviet-Russia.

As organized crime
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expert Joseph Alb ini pointed out, during the early 1990s,
the KGB was literally unclear as to what its role was,^
particularly since Gorbachev's "glasnost" policy meant a
major reduction in secret police repression of the
activities of the Soviet populace.

Moreover, the emerging

free-market economy made capitalism no longer a crime.
Hence, confusion reigned, for clarity on "legal" issues was
completely lacking.

As such, Russian society remained

marginalized and its citizens open to arbitrary arrest by
the KGB.

And contrary to the chekists' desires, the events

of August 1991 did not help the state security organization ;
instead, they weakened it.
Immediately following the August 1991 coup attempt,
several structural changes occurred within the Soviet
Union's security and intelligence services.

Specifically,

the massive KGB apparatus, with its numerous directorates,
departments, and services was broken down into several
smaller and weaker parts.
Some scholars suggest that Yeltsin's dismantling of the
powerful intelligence service was spawned by his effort to
ease the public outcry and widespread antagonism toward the
KGB, an antagonism that had been growing increasingly
intense since late (November) 1989 when the Berlin Wall fell
and Soviet-style communism was collapsing.°

Furthermore,

the public outcry, demonstrated by widespread protests in
the streets that occurred upon news of the coup leaders'
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attempts to crush the reforms and return the Soviet Union to
its former old totalitarian state

led Yeltsin to recognize

the political benefits he could reap in the form of public
support by his "dissolving” the KGB.
Even so, by looking at recent history, one could argue
that, ultimately, Yeltsin merely restructured the KGB to
ensure its removal as a threat to his newly-gained power.
Hence, instead of destroying the notorious secret police
organization, he maneuvered to bring it under his control.
Indeed, as Michael McFaul observed, if at any time the
security services could have been truly dismantled, the
opportunity had existed then, for both the Soviet Army and
the KGB were in a state of disarray.^
However, history has shown also that the Russian
government and secret police have always maintained a
symbiotic relationship.

Indeed, for centuries, Russia's

political leaders and secret police have been dependent upon
each other for power and survival.

A change in either the

political or economic system would not alter this trend.
In order to enhance his immediate security, Yeltsin's
initial move following the putsch was the transfer of the
RSFSR MVD pariiamentary guard unit into the RF Main Guards
Directorate (GUO).

He gave the unit "autonomous" status.

This security and protection unit operated under the
direction of Maj . Gen. Aleksandr K o r z h a k o v , a KGB-veteran
and Yeltsin's loyal bodyguard since 1986.^^

Being
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responsible for Yeltsin's immediate protection, Korzhakov
enjoyed daily access to him.

As such, he could greatly

influence the Kremlin decision-making process.

Indeed,

Korzheücov and Yeltsin were almost constantly together.

As a

consequence of this relationship, the power of state
security forces, particularly those under Korzhadcov's direct
control, increasingly expanded, as will be shown.
Immediately following the coup attempt, emd under great
pressure from Yeltsin, Gorbachev issued a decree that called
for the dismantling of the KGB.

He tasked his newly-

appointed KGB chief, former Interior Minister Vadim Beikatin,
to carry it out.

Hence, Bakatin, whom one year previously

had called for the KGB's elimination, now^^^^ sought to
establish legal civil controls^ in an effort to "reform"
the organization, as was stipulated by the decree.
Bakatin's initiatives, however, were unpopular and
ultimately unsuccessful,^^ for their aim was to make the
chekists accountedale for their actions; a noble idea, but
nonetheless, completely unrealistic, as was soon discovered.
Although legal controls were not instituted, many structural
changes did take place.
Under Bakatin's direction, over the period from late
August 1991 through December 1991, the various directorates,
departments, and services of the conglomerate KGB were
divided into six main entities.
The first, the Inter-republic Security Service
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(Mezhrepublikanskaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti, or MSB) now
consisted of the former USSR KGB Second Chief Directorate in
charge of counterintelligence; the KGB Third Chief
Directorate which dealt with military counterintelligence;
was now also responsible for the physical control of nuclear
weapons; the KGB Fifth Chief Directorate which dealt with
internal subversion emd dissidents, and which previously had
been called the Directorate for the Defense of the
Constitutional System was now renamed "Directorate Z" for
"zashchita" (or, "defense")),^° and the USSR KGB Information
Analysis Directorate of the former Second Chief Directorate,
which now produced daily intelligence assessments.
The MSB also was to serve as the coordinating body of
the Center and the republic KGBs.

In effect, domestic «md

counterintelligence functions were decentralized, with
direct, day-to-day control being transferred from the Center
to the newly independent Russian republics, each of which
had formed their own security and intelligence services
following communism's collapse.^

As such, the former KGB's

reach continued to extend throughout the country.

The

powerful Moscow KGB, however, was separate from MSB control
and, instead, was placed under the control of the Moscow
city government.

Specifically, the Moscow Mayor (Gavriil

Popov) gained official control of the Moscow KGB.^^

The

control of the Moscow KGB as of 1997 has been under the
control of Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov.
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Hence, the new MSB was responsible for domestic
intelligence, counterintelligence, the security of nuclear
weapons, emd intelligence analysis within the entire Russicm
Federation, except for Moscow.

Moreover, the MSB gained

control of the material resources of the former republic KGB
directorates; the new republic KGBs were started from
scratch.
This "decentralization" of the security and
intelligence forces served to offset the Kremlin's costs of
controlling the regional and local KGBs, costs the Kremlin
could ill afford at a time the Soviet-Russian economy was in
a state of complete collapse.

Moreover, calls for

independence and ethnic separatist uprisings were raging
throughout most of the republics, which would have required
great amounts of resources to quell end, hence, would have
been a major drain on Kremlin resources had Moscow retained
direct control of the republics' security services.
Nevertheless, Moscow continued to maintain a great amount of
political influence over the republic KGBs.

This

maintenance of the status quo was possible because, for the
most part, the seune chekists remained in their positions
there; so too, the informer networks remained, although
direct control over personnel and day-to-day operations were
transferred to the regional KGB and party leaders.
Naturally, since Bakatin had been appointed by
Gorbachev to oversee the reorganization of the massive KGB,
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he became chairman of the new MSB, which also made him chief
coordinator of the many newly-decentralized regional and
local domestic intelligence services that reached throughout
the entire Russian Federation.Furthermore, in his
capacity as MSB chief, Bakatin became chairman of the MSB
Council, of which the autonomous republicam KGB chiefs, and
the chiefs of foreign intelligence, communications and
signals intelligence, emd the Border Troops were also
members.
The second, the USSR Central Intelligence Service
(Tsentralnaya Sluzhba Razvedky, or TsSR) , consisted of the
former KGB First Chief Directorate (FCD) and was responsible
for foreign intelligence.

Further, the new TsSR assumed the

former KGB Sixth Directorate's functions of economic
counterintelligence and industrial s e c u r i t y . I t is
important to note that in September 1991, the foreign
intelligence service because an independent entity.

The

TsSR's independence from the other Russian security and
intelligence services was to ensure the survival of its
"federal" or "All-Union" status.

As Bakatin observed,

breaking up foreign intelligence or decentralizing its
control to the republics would have, in effect, virtually
destroyed it.^®

Yevgeniy Primakov, who had strong ties with

the former KGB,^ became the new head of foreign
intelligence, replacing Lt. Gen. Leonid Shebarshin, an
ardent anti-reformist.
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Third, the USSR Government Communications Committee
(Komitet Pravitel Stvennoye Sviazi, or KPS), consisted of
the former KGB Eighth Chief Directorate (signals
intelligence and cryptography), the Sixteenth Directorate
(technical penetration of foreign missions), the
Communications Troops, and numerous other directorates,
departments, academies emd higher schools of communications
and cryptology.
The KPS was responsible for Russia's entire
communications network, communications security,
cryptography, emd signals intelligence.

With such vast

capabilities, the KPS played a major role in active
measures, dis information, and economic espionage, in
collaboration with the TsSR (foreign intelligence) .

Lt.

Gen. Aleksandr Starovoytov, former deputy head of the former
KGB Eighth Chief Directorate, became KPS-chief following the
putsch.^
Fourth, the USSR Committee for the Protection of State
Borders, (Komitet po-Okhrana Gosudarsvennoye Granitsy, or
KOGG), consisted of the massive former KGB Border Troops
Chief Directorate and was responsible for customs and border
security.

Ilya Kalinichenko retained his position as head

of the Border Troops^° following the August 1991 events.
Fifth, the USSR Main Guard Directorate (Glavnoye
Upravleniye Okhrany, or GUO), which from August 1991 to
December 1991 had been called the USSR Protection Service,^
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consisted of the former KGB Ninth Directorate (Executive
Protection) and the elite KGB Alpha unit, which was
tremsferred into the Main Guard from the former KGB Seventh
Directorate (surveillance).

The GUO was responsible for the

protection of top political leaders, the Kremlin, and other
important political buildings.

Vladimir Redkoborodiy beceune

the new head of the Main Guard Directorate, replacing Lt.
Gen. Yuri Plekhanov, who had participated in the coup
attempt.
Sixth, the RSFSR Federal Security Agency (Agentsvo
Federalnoye Bezopasnosti, or AFB), consisted of the recently
created (April 1991) Russian Federation KGB (RKGB) which had
êüssorbed those sections, particularly the
counterintelligence sections (Second Chief Directorate) of
the USSR KGB that had not been transferred into the
aforementioned entities in the immediate, post-coup
reorganization.

The AFB itself was created three months

following the putsch, on November 29 of 1991."
Thus, the RKGB's power and control over resources,
including a vast and complex network of informers, had been
greatly expanded.

Indeed, the RKGB had gained control of

state security organs and resources in all the autonomous
republics, krays, and oblasts that formerly existed within
the vast territory of Russia in September 1991.^^
Previous to this significant transfer of power, in
fact, since its inception in April 1991 until the putsch.
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the RKGB had been weak and impotent, while the USSR KGB had
held real power.

Yeltsin had pushed for the creation of

the RKGB, claiming that all the Russian republics had KGBs
except for the vast Russian republic.

In doing so, Yeltsin

clearly intended to develop and strengthen his own secret
police network in an effort to build his growing power base,
in opposition to Gorbachev's Administration.^®

As always,

Russia's potential leaders endeavored to base their
political power on their own secret police support.
The new AFB consisted of the former USSR KGB Second
Chief Directorates that existed within Russian Federation
borders from St. Petersburg and extending throughout Siberia
to the Russian Far East.

Again, the Moscow KGB had been

given special status: it was placed under the control of the
Moscow city council, which was led by Moscow's mayor.
This trend continues today.
The AFB was responsible for combatting organized crime,
terrorism, drug trafficking, contreü3and, and corruption.
Such tasks reflected the state of affairs within SovietRussian borders in the post-cold war world.

The political-

economic situation was one of fundamental lawlessness as the
battle for state resources raged throughout the Former
Soviet Union (FSU).

Nevertheless, in what was a smooth

transition, RKGB Chairman Ivanenko became head of the AFB.^®
However, the organization survived for only three weeks
before the other chekist agencies eüssorbed it in the next

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

24
restructuring, thereby eliminating reformist-minded
Ivanenko's position and, in effect, ousting him.^
The dismantling of the KGB applied only to state
security and intelligence forces.

In other words, the

regular militia forces (regular police), which included the
USSR MVD and the RF MVD, remained unaffected by these
reorganizations and, therefore, maintained their structures,
at least for a brief period of time.
This reorganization of the Soviet-Russiem security and
intelligence services had been accomplished cUsruptly, and
would be followed by the seuae pattern as political intrigues
and needs to alter the security services' image developed.
Indeed, the entire country had been in a state of convulsion
as Soviet institutions crumbled in the fallout of German
reunification and the collapse of communism within the
former Soviet bloc states.

The political climate had

required that the security and intelligence services be
rearranged, however temporary the changes would be.
Indeed, just three weeks after the AFB had been
created, on December 19, 1991, in a major power grab,
interim Interior Minister Viktor Barannikov persuaded
Yeltsin to sign a decree that merged the MSB and the USSR
MVD into one organization, and merged the RF AFB and the RF
MVD into one organization, emd then combined these two new
and larger entities to form one massive Ministry of Security
and Interior Affairs (Ministerstvo Bezopasnosti i
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Vnutrennykh Del, or MBVD)
The date of the decree creating the new security and
intelligence service is notable: December 20, 1991 marked
the 74th emniversary of the creation of the Cheka.

Indeed,

to this day, state security officers are paid on the 20th
day of each month to commemorate that special and symbolic
day.'*^

Many scholars agree that, contrary to the essence of

the chekists' "new image," any genuine break with the past
was nonexistent.
Naturally, Barannikov became the chairman of the
unified and, hence, more powerful security and intelligence
service, negating the necessity of Bakatin's position, which
was conveniently eliminated (just as Ivanenko's position had
abruptly ended).

Either way, Bakatin's days heading the KGB

successor agency were numbered; many chekists viewed his
transfer of the KGB's blueprints of the installation of
listening devices in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow to U.S.
Ambassador Robert S. Strauss as a treasonous act;*^
consequently, Bakatin's ouster was ineviteüale.
As a result of this new merger of security and police
forces, the USSR and RF MVDs were combined and placed under
MVD-veteran Viktor Yerin's direction.

So, too, the chekist

organizations, the MSB and AFB, were ultimately placed under
MVD control through the high command of MBVD chief (and MVDveteran) Barannikov.

Hence, the MVD was officially in

control of state security.

This arrangement would prove
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unworkeüsle, as will be discussed.
Concurrent with these changes within the domestic
security emd intelligence services, the TsSR (foreign
intelligence) was brought under Russian control emd, to
reflect this chemge, was reneuned the External Intelligence
Service (Sluzhba Vneshney Razvedki, or SVR).

Within the

context of the setting of legal norms or recognition of any
rule of law, like the domestic KGB successor agencies, no
real changes either in methods or personnel took place
within the foreign intelligence service.

Instead, only an

appearance of efforts to change its image were attempted.
For example, contrary to official SVR statements that
"active measures" had ceased, the former CPSU International
Department (ID), which handled this sphere, was simply
absorbed into the new SVR.**
Other changes within Russian intelligence structures
also occurred.

Eight days later, on December 28, 1991, the

KPS (comint, sigint) was renamed the Federal Agency for
Government Communications and Information (Federalnoye
Agentsvo Pravitel Stvennoye Sviazi, or FAPSI).

Furthermore,

the KOGG (Border Protection) was renamed the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) Border Troops.*®
The heads of the SVR (foreign intelligence), FAPSI
(signals and communications intelligence), and the Border
Troops (border protection) remained the same.

However, the

GUO (Main Guard Directorate) received a new chief, Lt. Gen.
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Mikhail Barsukov, who answered directly to Yeltsin.*®
Indeed, each reorganization brought the secret police more
solidly under Yeltsin's direct control.

Moreover, each

restructuring had resulted in increases in the chekists'
powers, which they had been regaining ever since they had
reached their nadir following the putsch.
Barannikov's massive MBVD, with its blending of
chekists with MVD forces, was reminiscent of the nefarious
former Security Minister Beria's 1934 reorganization that
had entailed a similar combining of security and
intelligence forces with the regular police that had made
him immensely powerful, and which had culminated in the
creation of the notoriously brutal NKVD.

However, as J.

Michael Waller noted, the intense and ubiquitous opposition
by the former KGB officers of being relegated to "equal"
status with the militia forces*^ led to yet another
reorganization less than one month later.
On January 16, 1992, Yeltsin signed a decree that
separated from the MBVD the state security and regular
police forces.

In other words, the MBVD was dissolved and a

new state security organization was established.

The

chekists were transferred into a newly-created Ministry of
Security (Minsterstvo Bezopasnosti, or MB) , while the
regular police forces (the two newly-combined MVD
organizations) now formed a much larger MVD, remaining under
Yerin's control.*®

Yeltsin placed the new MB under
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Barannikov's control.

Like Beücatin's, AFB-head Ivemenko's

position was conveniently negated by this reorganization and
he was ousted.

It is important to note that both Bakatin

and Ivanenko had been reformist-minded.Indeed,
Barannikov took this opportunity to replace meuiy reformistminded officers in the state security remks with hard
liners.®®
The newly-created MB consisted of the entire former KGB
Second Chief Directorate (counterintelligence), the Third
Chief Directorate (military counterintelligence), the Chief
Directorate for Combatting Contraband and Corruption, the
Internal Security Directorate, the Sixth Directorate
(economic and industrial security), emd the Directorate for
Combatting Terrorism, whose title was merely the cover for
the same old former Fifth Chief Directorate (dissidents,
ethnics, nationalists) that had supposedly been "truly
abolished" during the Gorbachev era."

After all, state

security then considered and continues to laibel political
dissidents as criminals and terrorists.
Essentially, the new state security organization was
responsible for the KGB's traditional functions of
maintaining internal security and suppressing political
opposition.

Indeed, political surveillance was conducted on

an ever greater scale as Yeltsin sought to more firmly
secure his grasp on power. ®^
Six months after the MB's creation, in June 1992, the
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Border Troops lost the autonomy they had enjoyed since the
putsch and were placed again under state security control.
The complex situation on the Russian Federation's borders
made this subordination inevitable.

Barannikov persuaded

Yeltsin to replace Kalinichenko with Lt. Gen. Vladimir
Shlyaüchtin®® as head of border security.
To bolster his security against the growing strength of
his political rivals, in mid-1993, Yeltsin created the
Presidential Security Service (Sluzhba Bezopasnosti
Presidents, or SBP).®*

This new entity consisted of the

newly-autonomous parlieunentary guards unit, and was under
KGB-veteran Aleksandr Korzhêücov's direction.

Yeltsin had

removed the unit from the control of the Main Guard
Directorate (GUO) , and made it answereüsle directly to him.
Consequently, Korzhakov's political power and influence
greatly increased for he enjoyed direct access to Yeltsin on
a day-to-day basis and, hence, was able to keep a constant
pulse on Kremlin affairs emd policy.
The SBP's responsibilities included the direct
protection of the Russian president.

Basically, the unit

operated as Yeltsin's own personal security service.

Since

gaining its autonomy, the presidential security unit's power
continually increased as it grew from strictly a guard
service, to next gaining basic intelligence and
counterintelligence functions, to then becoming one
encompassing many aspects of the former KGB's work.
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this orgemization constituted Yeltsin's own fiefdom.
To conceal the covert intelligence and spying functions
of the new SBP, its regulation was kept a secret.

In fact,

it was not until April 1996, a period of

over two-and-a-half

years since the orgemization's creation,

that the

"Regulation of the RF Presidential Security Service" was
officially confirmed by a Yeltsin decree.®®
According to the secret regulation,

SBP functions

included "revealing, warning and putting

a stop to any

unlawful actions at places outlined by the President."

This

wording is quite undefined and eunbiguous and, in short, ceui
be interpreted as including the wide-ranging tasks of
intelligence, counterintelligence, and, most notably,
political surveillance.

Thus, in essence, the SBP was

granted the authority, in fact, was mandated, to maintain,
among others, constemt and close surveillance of Yeltsin's
political opposition forces.
extend indefinitely.

As such, the SBP's reach could

Moreover, the regulation's design

provided Korzhakov's unit a license to engage in all manner
of political intrigue.

Hence, it was indeed appropriate

when a Moscow News writer leüaeled Korzhakov the "Shadow
Minister".®®

The IcUdel has stuck.

As the conflicts between Yeltsin and his reformers and
hard-liners in the parlieunent grew more intense, Yeltsin was
forced to rely increasingly on his state security forces to
support him and keep him in power.

However, the state
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security chief, Barannikov, was providing Yeltsin's
political opposition with evidence of corruption within
Yeltsin's government.®^

Hence, in July 1993, near the time

when Yeltsin had created the SBP, Yeltsin dismissed
Baremnikov from his post as head of the MB.

Soon

thereafter, ironically, the former MB chief was himself
charged with corruption.

Yeltsin's (former) KGB forces were

obviously at work here.
In addition to the fact that Barannikov cooperated with
Yeltsin's political opposition, his dismissal was also
likely a consequence of his corresponding failure to
demonstrate sufficient support to Yeltsin vis-a-vis the
escalating rift between the hard-liners and Yeltsin's
Administration.®®

Hence, on July 28, 1993, Lt. Gen. Nikolay

Golushko, who had served both as former chief of the former
KGB Fifth Chief Directorate and former chairman of the
Ukrainian KGB, replaced Barannikov®® as MB-head.
Furthermore, Barannikov's Border Troops appointee, Lt. Gen.
Vladimir Shylyakhtin, was replaced by army officer Col. Gen.
Andrey Nikolaev.®®

Both dismissals were effected under the

pretext of the failure of the MB and its subordinate Border
Troops to quell unrest at the Taj ik-Afghanistan border, in
addition to the "violation of ethical norms."®^
The KGB regularly found evidence of corruption by
government officials once their positions within Yeltsin's
Administration were lost.

Yeltsin's divide-and-rule policy.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

32
which he relentlessly practiced toward his political
appointees, made for an unstable but, nonetheless, highlydesired career choice process among Russia's elite.

The

desire for political power, however temporary, ensured a
constemt stream of aspiring (party) hacks.
Shortly after Yeltsin's (September 21, 1993)
announcement that he was dissolving the parliament, in
October 1993, the hard-liners in parlieunent took control of
the Russiem Supreme Soviet building.

Even though the

security services under Golushko's control had provided
Yeltsin only lukewarm support during the bloody
confrontation, the rebellion was crushed by Yeltsin's
forces.

The perpetrators, specifically Yeltsin's main

political rivals, former Russian Vice President Aleksandr
Rutskoi and ex-Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov,
were arrested and imprisoned, only to be granted amnesty in
February 1994 by a parlieunentary resolution of the new,
hard-1ine-dominated Duma.
Following the October crisis and in recognition of the
need for a stronger state security organization that he
could rely on to provide him greater support in his fight
against political adversaries, Yeltsin moved to reinforce
the ranks.

In addition to the recent events within Kremlin

political circles, the communists' win in the December 1993
parlieunentary elections provided Yeltsin a clear signal that
he was losing his grip on power.

Moreover, as Boris
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Pustintsev observed, Yeltsin had received false information
eü3out the state of Russian public opinion from his
intelligence services and, hence, had been caught by
surprise when the communists won by great margins in that
December 1993 parlieunentary elections; this realization,
made changes in the secret police, particularly in the wake
of the October crisis, imperative.
Hence, Yeltsin determined that another reorganization
of the Russian security and intelligence forces was
mandatory.

Therefore, in an effort to negate his political

weaknesses and to fortify his ranks against the communists'
growing influence, on December 21, 1993 Yeltsin again
reorganized the state security services.

The MB was

"dissolved," declared "unreformzdale",®* and renamed the
Federal Counterintelligence Service (Federalnaya Sluzhba
Kontrarazvedki, or FSK).
In line with the Russian government's practice of
always seeking to shape a positive image for its chekist
organizations, the new state security apparatus was
relegated from "ministry" to "service" status to give the
appearance that the chekists' powers were being weakened.
Even so, in an overt contradiction to this "new image,"
former "dissident-hunter"®® Golushko continued to head the
renamed orgauiization, and kept his ministerial status,
which, one could reason, was to help ensure that the
transition from the MB to the FSK was relatively stable.
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Golushko's chairmamship was short-lived, however, for as
some researchers speculate, Yeltsin soon removed him because
of his insufficient provision of support during the October
crisis®® and the subsequent release of Yeltsin's political
enemies from prison.®^

News reports indicated that Golushko

"was ousted for failing to block the release of the hard
liners".®®

Again, it was success in defeating Yeltsin's

political enemies that seemed to ensure no loss of position
at the helm of Russian security and intelligence forces.
Yeltsin appointed Sergei Stepashin (who had headed the
Stepashin Commission that was formed in 1991 to investigate
the security and intelligence service in the wake of the
August 1991 coup attempt) , to head the new FSK, a position
he had actually been marked for since December, but which
Golushko had held for the past three months, again, most
likely to provide for some continuity while the security
forces underwent great change.®®
Soon after renzuming the state security apparatus the
FSK, (in January 1994), Yeltsin removed the Border Troops
from state security control and renzuned the organization the
Federal Border Service (Federalnaya Pogranichnaya Sluzhba).
Moreover, in an effort to further enhance his tight control
over the newly-reorganized security forces, Yeltsin made the
Border Troops subordinate directly to him, ® zmd kept
Nikolayev as their chief.
The statute of the new FSK made the domestic security
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and intelligence organization responsible directly to
Y e l t s i n . T h e FSK was responsible for counterintelligence;
at least, the FSK's main stated function was
counterintelligence.

During 1994 interviews with two

reliable zmd knowledgeable informzmts, the author incpiired
as to the main function of the contemporary KGB; both
responded that it was counterintelligence.

They then

continued, describing the main activities of the former KGB
as being different now than before communism's collapse.
Since communism's demise, they said, domestic political
surveillance was a major KGB activity for now "there is not
just one political party, but many" that need to be
monitored/"
What the informants revealed was that the domestic
intelligence service's main function was
counterintelligence, but then they described the main
activities as much more - - close political surveillance of
numerous political parties, in addition to other tasks, such
as counterintelligence.
By the Russian authorities' official claim that the
FSK's main function is counterintel 1 igence, they, in effect,
may be attempting to alter the perception of the FSK from
one that views the apparatus as conducting domestic spying
operations of Yeltsin's political opposition on a massive
scale to one meant to intimidate foreigners, since
counterintelligence equals the thwarting of hostile FIS
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activities.

This response provides a very different picture

of what the Russian intelligence services' activities are,
which pointedly conflict with the "democratic" image it has
sought to project. *®
In further confirmation, other scholars have found that
Stepashin, in his position as FSK-head, actively promoted
the continuation of political surveillance on the domestic
front. ®

Indeed, with the monumental growth in the number

of political parties in Russia by 1994, the FSK greatly
escalated its political investigation activities and
domestic spying operations.
As an informant confirmed during a 1995 interview with
the author, the current situation in Russia, then, required
that numerous political parties be monitored by the former
KGB."

Since 1987, and more specifically, in post-communist

Russia, many different political parties had emerged.

As

such, the KGB's successors spied on those parties that
opposed their own particular master.®

For example, the

Moscow KGB, which was under the control of the Moscow mayor,
spied on the Yeltsin Administration and Yeltsin's security
services, and vice-versa.

Inevitably, this led to clashes

between chekists.
Moreover, the situation became one where the dominant
political parties were also kept under surveillance by
"privatized" KGB officers, who were working for commercial
interests.

Loyalties zunong former KGB officers shifted from
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the Soviet state to the particular master they happened to
serve at the time, be it a private businessman or a public
figure.

"Reform" of the secret police was not on the

agenda.

Rather, as Amy Knight observed, to deal with the

course of domestic chekistry, Yeltsin preserved and,
further, increased the powers of the state security and
intelligence services under his control to fight his
political opposition.’®
The FSK's statute made the organization responsible for
counterintelligence, fighting terrorism, drug and weapons
trafficking, ethnic separatism, organized crime, and
economic counterintelligence.®®

Since the FSK was working

within a free-market economy, Stepashin argued that the role
of the state security apparatus in monitoring business
enterprises was crucial in order for the chekists to
maintain control over the economic well-being of the
country.®’

In reality, the chekists applied economic

intelligence and counter intel 1igence tactics (backed up by
their increased investigative powers) to force out honest
business and take over, in cooperation with government
officials and organized criminals, successful and
potentially successful private businesses in Russia.

These

activities will be examined in detail in later chapters.
Moreover, the old campaign of vigilance against foreign
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spies* gained momentum in 1994, as reflected in the Russian
media emd at security conferences.®^

The FSK's statute,

then, incorporated immense powers to the chekists.

As Amy

Knight pointed out, by the end of 1994, the state security
apparatus had finally become more powerful them its
communist predecessor, the formideüale former KGB.®’
The conflict in Chechnya that erupted in December 1994
resulted in large-scale FSK operations to undermine and
overthrow the Dudayev-led rebel government there.®*

Former

KGB Gen. Oleg Kalugin observed that Yeltsin's handling of
the conflict in Chechnya signaled the increasing influence
of the security forces.®®

It was a priority of the FSK to

gather intelligence in the "recalcitrant" republic with the
aim of crushing the rebel movement.

As the fighting and

loss of life escalated, reports surfaced indicating that
SBP-head Korzhakov had prevented military intelligence
assessments recommending no intervention in Chechnya from
reaching Yeltsin®®.

However, Amy Knight pointed out that

this "unlikely claim" concerned GRÜ intelligence reports,®’
not FSK assessments, which supports the view that the
Russian government's losing battle in Chechnya was primarily
an FSK operational failure, and, as such, one could infer
that Stepashin's FSK was to blame.

The FSK's attempts to

Stephashin had warned of the greatly increased threat posed
by foreign spies at an April 1994, 3-day conference on
"Security of the Individual, Society, State and Russiem
Special Services."
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subvert the Dudayev government had repeatedly failed.
Moreover, the demoralized Russiem military, which had been
sent to the republic to crush the rebellion in December
1994, was constantly humiliated by the rebels.
Amy Knight has commented that the military blamed its
losses on faulty intelligence provided by the FSK.

However,

she observed, it was highly unlikely that the 6RU was not
collecting its own intelligence on the Chechnya situation.®®
Ultimately, not only did no one want to take the blame for
the inability of the Russian government forces to end the
crisis, but Stepashin (and his FSK) was caught up in a
political struggle against Korzhakov emd his corrupt
military intelligence associates;®® those who were involved
in many lucrative arms deals,®® and, further, who were, it
was speculated, profiting from their engagement in trade
with organized criminals in the Chechen republic (and the
"near eüaroad") and who were aided in their commercial
pursuits by exploiting the war, to FSK-head Stepashin's
disadvantage.®’
In June 1995, in the immediate wake of the rebels'
seizure of hostages at Budennovsk,®^ and, as the end result
of FSK-chief Stepashin's bungling of multiple operations
against the Chechens, Stepashin was dismissed.®®

Korzhakov

and his men had won the political battle.
In light of this crisis situation for state security,
in April 1995, a new law was passed that still more greatly
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broadened state security's powers.®*

To reflect the changes

to state security implicit in this law, the state security
organization was renamed; it would be called the Federal
Security Service (Federalnaya Sluzhba Bezopasnosti, or FSB).
Like the other Russian security and intelligence agencies'
statutes, the FSB statute made the organization responsible
directly to Yeltsin.®®
The "Law on Organs of the Federal Security Service"
fully restored the agency's investigative powers and its
control over prisons emd special troop detachments, which
powers had been lost in the immediate aftermath of the
putsch.

Part of this change included state security's

regaining full control of its "prisons and investigative"
departments,®® thus, further increasing the chekists' power.
Further, the FSB gained communications security (comsec)
functions.®’ More importamtly, the law expanded FSB
authority beyond Russia's borders; an implication being that
the new law could be interpreted as providing for an overlap
of jurisdiction with other chekist agencies, particularly
the SVR (foreign intelligence).
Even so, it is notable that this expansion of FSB
powers beyond Russia's borders most likely referred to the
geographic areas of the "near cibroad," which were understood
to be those republics surrounding Russia's immediate borders
rather than classic foreign states, which remained solely
within SVR jurisdiction.

As Amy Knight pointed out, the
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April 1995 lav explicitly authorized the FSB to "establish
formal relationships" with the security and intelligence
services of the "near abroad" in an effort to coordinate
state security activities and to cooperate on intelligence
matters.
By 1996, the Russian intelligence services had signed
extradition agreements with many of the republics'
intelligence services, and cooperation in capturing and
extraditing targeted "terrorists" (dissidents) had
occurred.®®

The Kremlin's efforts to close formal

intelligence agreements with the various republic KGBs
demonstrated the overt intention of the Russian government
to reintegrate the Russian Federation with the "near
abroad," in antagonism to the institution of any legal,
procedural guarantees and the building and development of
democratic institutions.
Soon thereafter, Yeltsin moved Barsukov from his
position as head of the GUO (Main Guard Directorate) to
replace Stepashin as FSB chief.

Barsukov's new appointment

was accompanied by the transfer of the Alpha unit from the
GUO to the FSB.’°°

In other words, Barsukov brought his

elite forces with him (to the FSB) .

One week later, in what

had become a complete reversal of control, Yeltsin placed
the GUO under the jurisdiction of the SBP.

In the process,

the GUO was made responsible directly to the President.’®’
Barsukov's former deputy, Yuri Kravipin, beceune the new GUO-
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head.

In effect, Barsukov and Korzhakov together, now

controlled state security, and, thus, had become immensely
powerful.
As Amy Knight observed, the name change was significemt
because it replaced "counterintelligence” with "security,"
and thus reflected the expanded powers and duties of the
state security apparatus.

In fact, the new name more

accurately described the all -encompass ing role the state
security service played on Russia's domestic front.
The June 16, 1996 presidential elections brought
further significant changes to state security and
intelligence structures.

Yeltsin's intense struggle against

both ultra-nationalist Gennady Zyuganov, who enjoyed
communist party support, and nationalist army general
Aleksandr Lebed, who also enjoyed widespread support, forced
him to employ his security forces against his political
opposition in order to impede their goals of attaining
political power and, more importantly, to retain his own
grip on power.

Barsukov and Korzhakov played a key role in

the competition; indeed, Yeltsin's security forces needed no
prodding.
Since Russian politics operates on the patron-client
model, Korzhakov and Barsukov both had a high stake in the
election's o u t c o m e . B o t h employed a wealth of resources,
including those in the form of currency that they had reüced
off the profits of many of their corrupt cronies' business
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enterprises, particularly those involved in arms êuid oil
d e a l s , i n an effort to ensure a Yeltsin win.

In spite of

their efforts, 13 days before the run-off election, Yeltsin
fired both Barsukov emd Korzhakov, along with First Deputy
Prime Minister Oleg Soskovets, in yet another power play and
political power struggle.
What role, if any, that newly-appointed National
Security Advisor Aleksandr Lebed, Prime Minister Viktor
Chernomyrdin, or Presidential Chief-of-Staff Anatoli Chubais
played in the events surrounding Yeltsin's removal of his
top aides is purely speculative.

Intrigue surrounded the

arrest by Korzhakov's and Barsukov's men of two of Chubais'
campaign aides who were taking $500,000 out of the White
House just days before the run-off e l e c t i o n . K o r z h a k o v ' s
and Barsukov's men had interrogated the campaign workers for
eleven hours before releasing them.
One explanation is that Yeltsin purged his close
advisors to accommodate the democratic candidate Grigori
Yavlinsky and the liberals associated with the liberal
economist and presidential chief-of-staff Anatoly Chubais.
It is possible that Chubais pressured Yeltsin to oust them;
indeed, Chubais and Korzhakov had long been enemies.
Another explanation is that Yeltsin sacrificed his
long-term, loyal security men to appease the millions of
communist party-supporting pensioners who viewed Barsukov,
Korzhakov, and Soskovets as deeply corrupt officials.
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Actually, Yeltsin's political maneuvering may well have been
accomplished in an effort to sway this significant (by its
large numbers) sector of voters in the upcoming (July 1996)
run-off election by presenting a picture of coming economic
reform, a clampdown on official corruption, emd meaningful
government consideration of their worsening finemcial
plight.
Whatever the reason, the natural result of Yeltsin's
ousting of Barsukov and Korzhaücov resulted in yet another
structural change of Russian state security forces.
Yeltsin named veteran chekist Nikolai Kovalev,
(Barsukov's top deputy) as acting chief of the FSB.^°®
Furthermore, the SBP, which had become immensely powerful
while under Korzhakov's control, was folded back into the
GUO (Main Guard Directorate) from which it had been removed
in 1991.
Yeltsin appointed Lt. Gen. Yuri Kravipin as the new
head of the GUO, and further, gave him the additional task
of heading the federal bodyguard service, replacing
Korzhakov as Yeltsin's personal bodyguard.

Soon thereafter,

however, Lt. Col. Anatoli Kuznetsov, who had been trained by
the KGB's Ninth Chief Directorate, and was reportedly
handpicked by Korzhakov, was confirmed as Yeltsin's personal
bodyguard.
Without Korzhakov's leadership, the SBP lost a
substantial eunount of political clout.

The Los Angeles
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Times reported that Korzhakov had commanded 10,000 men as
SBP-head, and moreover, by way of his influence over 600head Barsukov, had enjoyed de facto control over 15,000
(GUO) t r o o p s . T h e Moscow News, however, issued a report
that the change in leadership was unlikely to affect the
organization's p e r f o r m a n c e . I n e v i t a b l y , new GUO-head
Kravipin ultimately ceune to wield less influence on
Yeltsin's policies than Korzhakov had.
Further, the new reorganization entailed the creation
of a new (newly-reneuned) state security organization.

On

June 20, 1996, Yeltsin signed a decree reneuning the GUO the
Federal Protection Service (Federalnaya Sluzhba Okhrany, or
FSO).^^^

Yeltsin placed Kravipin at its head in a smooth

transition."^

Additionally, Yeltsin appointed new FSO-chief

Kravipin to also serve as the acting chief of the SBP.^^^
Days later, on July 2, 1996, Yeltsin signed a decree
that merged the new FSO with the SBP.

The new agency was

called the State Protection Service (GSO).

In another

smooth transition, Yeltsin appointed FSO-head Kravipin to
head the new GSO (State Protection Service)."^
Therefore, as of late 1996, six major security and
intelligence organizations, including the regular police,
were in existence in Russia.

These included: 1) the SVR; 2)

FAPSI; 3) the FSB; 4) the GSO; 5) the Federal Border
Service ; and, 6) the MVD.
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The demise of the Soviet Union and the introduction of
a free-market economy augered many changes in the operations
of Russia's security and intelligence agencies.
Furthermore, the multiple name emd structural changes that
occurred within the domestic security and intelligence
services had led to much confusion, frustration, and
aggravation among chekists, which invariably affected the
Russian foreign intelligence service, also.

And as is the

case with all sovereign states, the situation on the
domestic front was inherently linked with foreign events.
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CHAPTER 3
THE NEW OLIGARCHY
During the late 1980s and early 1990s, phenomenal
changes were taking place within Soviet-Russian economic
structures.

This period marked the beginning of the

trams it ion from a command to a market economy.

Kremlin

leaders, in colladaoration with the KGB, had struggled to
keep reforms in check but the situation had spiraled out of
control.^ Consequently, there was a major shift in the
political power structures as opportunities and weaknesses
within Moscow and the regional governments were exploited by
corrupt officials and organized criminals.
From the instituting of communism in 1917 until 1989
when Gorbachev's reforms began to take hold, the Soviet
Union had been ruled by an oligarchy consisting of the CCCP
SU, the Soviet military, and the KGB.

These were the so-

called "power ministries" that held Soviet social-politicaleconomic structures and institutions together for over 70
repressive years by exercising total control.

But as

communism's collapse loomed imminent, a new oligarchy was
taking shape and organizing its future stronghold on power

53
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in Russia.
This new oligarchy consisted of the political elitenomenklatura, which replaced the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CCCP SU ), organized
crime (OC) elements, which filled the void left by the
debilitated Soviet military, and the omnipresent KGB.

As

such, since 1991, Yeltsin and his reformers, along with many
old party bosses, have constituted Russia's political elite.
Increasingly, the conservative leadership of Russia has been
influenced by the young, new entrepreneurs; mainly,
Russia's "new rich".

While reformist-minded people

comprised much of Yeltsin's Administration, the regional and
local governments continued to be directed and controlled by
old-line party apparatchiks.

Many old communist party

bureaucrats also remained within the Moscow city government
structures.
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize a major
distinction between Moscow and the periphery.

Moscow has

become a city alive with capitalist frenzy while the
numerous oblasts and krays within the vast territory of
Russia remain unmodemized and in their previous Soviet
state - - minus the money and benefits that the central
government used to supply in order to prop up these areas.^
Hence, from an intelligence point-of-view, the distinction
is sharp in that chekists in the periphery continue to
operate as they always have toward the peoples of Russia's
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outer regions; the secret police system, with all its
abuses, remains the same.

Within these localities, the

chekists, along with the old communist party hacks, retain
firm control.
By 1989, the Soviet military was weak from the Afghem
War, suffering from low morale, plagued by widespread
corruption, and in great disarray.^

As a result, it had

lost considerable influence over events within the Soviet
Union's traditional sphere of influence.

And despite the

fact that the Russian republics had quickly gained
independence from Moscow, the military nonetheless lost its
influential power within the former Soviet Union and,
further, the new Russiem Federation itself.

Its place

within the old oligarchy was replaced by others,
specifically, by organized criminals, as will be discussed.
The third component of the old oligarchy, the KGB, for
the most part emerged unscathed from communism's collapse
and the phenomenal changes that took place from 1989-1991
and, hence, retained its position within the (new)
oligarchy.^

During this period, the intelligence service

was quite active, as will be shown.

Thus, the power vacuum

created by a weak and corruption-plagued Soviet military,
coupled with a transforming economy that lacked any
significant banking, business, contract, or tax laws,
enéibled OC elements to gain great influence and, hence, fill
this power vacuum.
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Russia's changed political situation was shaped by key
events that followed the crumbling of communism.

When the

Soviet Union's communist party-controlled government
collapsed, the ensuing power struggles shifted control to
orgemized criminals.

This "transfer" of control was

accomplished at the behest of the top Kremlin leaders
through their utilization of the KGB.

The KGB had been

vigilantly monitoring the course of events for the party,
and was acutely aware of the situation.

The KGB had

remained a formidable force throughout the tumultuous
changes in Russia because of its widespread participation in
stimulating them.
Throughout the events of this critical period, the
secret police continued to serve as the Soviet-Russian
leaders' bulwark against opposition forces; however, at a
cost.

Therefore, how these "new oligarchy" linkages

developed and were consummated requires analysis before any
discussion of the significance, consequences, or possible
future of these relationships can be understood.
The CPSU's Grand Theft
It is of crucial importance to recognize that the
current power structure, or "new oligarchy" of Russia
formed, developed, and then burgeoned into a powerful force
as a result of economic forces.

(Ideology is dead).

particular, an unintended consequence of Gorbachev's
"perestroika" program was that it served as the major
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catalyst for the "new capitalism" in Russia and facilitated
its control by mobsters.

Perestroika further served as the

cloak under which the highly corrupt Kremlin leadership
worked to transfer the Soviet state's wealth into private
overseas accounts, investments, and enterprises.^
The KGB's role in perestroika was multi-faceted.
Specifically, from 1989-91, it was a priority of the KGB
First Chief Directorate (FCD), responsible for foreign
intelligence, to create foreign business partnerships.^

As

part of perestroika, the CPSU's official, stated purpose of
its progrcua of forming joint ventures (JVs) with foreigners,
and particularly foreign compemies, was to aid in the growth
of the domestic economy.^

In reality, these JVs aided the

corrupt Kremlin leadership in its removal of Soviet wealth
to private interests outside Russia emd beyond the reach of
anyone who would seek to repatriate it, including any
domestic authority's control.
Indeed, many Russian investigators were sent to the
West by the Russian government to locate the stolen wealth.
However, when they succeeded in tracing the money, no
criminal proceedings would be initiated.*

Once evidence of

fraud was found, as the investigators soon discovered, the
Kremlin's determination to "recover" the stolen funds and
punish those who perpetuated the fraud was quite insincere.
Instead of making arrests, the authorities had reasoned that
the bulk of the wealth had already been blended with honest
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money and, hence, was uncollectible.

In addition to these

factors, according to investigators, the exposure of the
thieves would prove to be a major political embarrassment to
the government since many of those currently holding
government positions had either directed or held close ties
with those individuals who actually controlled the stolen
wealth.*

In light of these conditions, Russiem prosecutors

took no legal action.
These transfers of money emd resources were
accomplished through KGB channels, which were the only
channels open to such dealings, and which often employed OC
elements to assist in the task.

The KGB had the networks

and the contacts, along with the information and know-how,
to form and operate the front companies necessary to build
these relationships.

The KGB was the crucial link that

cemented Soviet-Russia's political leaders to OC.
As proof, when the Supreme Soviet Investigation of the
1991 Coup held hearings in February 1992, "About the Illegal
Financial Activity of the CPSÜ" it found that virtually
billions of dollars worth of state-owned hard cash and
resources had been transferred out of the country by the
leaders of the CPSÜ as the inevitable collapse of the Soviet
Union approached; this was accomplished by utilizing De
controlled banks and KGB couriers to negotiate the task."*
In the months preceding the USSR's official demise (December
25, 1991), literally billions of dollars worth of state
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resources were simply "gone without a trace."

Thus, the new

and powerful oligarchical relationship had been secured.

It

is the remnants of this oligarchy which now controls Russia,
for the current political leadership has maintained its
numerous ties and associations with those guilty of the
theft of the nation.
The Rapid Ascension of Organized Crime
OC elements did not gain power in partnership with the
political elite and the KGB overnight.

Corruption within

the old Soviet oligarchy had become increasingly flagrant,
particularly since 1953, the year of Stalin's death."

As

Victor Sheüsalin points out, during the Lenin and Stalin
eras, KGB relations with OC elements entailed chekist
infiltrations into crime groups^^ along with all others that
existed in Soviet society, including those emigre groups
that formed outside Soviet borders."

As such, these

infiltrations included the notorious "vory v zakone," or
"thieves-in-law."
The "thieves-in-law" is an organization that consists
of hardened criminals, many of whom have "made their bones."
They pledge to be criminals and only criminals.

As Gen.

Gennady Chebotaryev of the MVD's Directorate of Organized
Crime observes, they will never work a legal job, join the
army, pay taxes, be law-eüaiding, etc..

Further, they must

serve time in jail, a mark of their criminality and usually
a prerequisite for them to move up in the ranks.
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during the Soviet era, it was in the gulag that ranks euid
rites had been renewed.
According to an informant, the KGB infiltrated the
"thieves-in-law" by introducing its young recruits into the
crime group.

The KGB would then track and aid their

"progress up the ranks" by creating situations whereby they
could act to elevate their status.
controlled the prisons.

Note that the KGB

So, the KGB could further

facilitate their moles' move up the ranks while they did
their prison time. In effect, the KGB nursed them all the
way to the top, managing key penetrations.

Thus, the KGB

gained some control, and derived the benefits with which
control brings, by infiltrating these groups."
However, during the Khrushchev and Brezhnev eras, the
nature of KGB-criminal relationships changed: the KGB began
to work with the criminal groups to achieve their and the
communist party leaders' specific criminal goals; in other
words, corruption became reunpant.Moreover, during
Andropov's long tenure as KGB chief and ultimately party
leader, these associations became more sophisticated and
highly developed."
The Perennial Chekist Services
The KGB emerged unscathed from the monumental collapse
of Soviet institutions.

Indeed, the secret police apparatus

remained a major pillar of power within Russia following
communism's collapse.

However, the cold war's end demeuided
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a new role for Russian intelligence.

No longer was the

KGB's mission the spread of and preservation of communism.
Nor was Moscow to strive any longer to gain access to
foreign resources under the cloak of the Workers' Party.
With the cold war's end and as a result of the adhesive
development of the new Russian oligarchy, <md due to the
change from a commemd to market economy, the nature of
Russian espionage changed.

Ideology was replaced by a

desire for personal wealth.
For example, an officer at the Main Intelligence
Directorate indicated that the security services were not
interested in state secrets.

Rather, efforts were now

concentrated on discovering compromising information on
individuals, specifically the wealthy and powerful, and then
blackmailing them;" hence, the greater emphasis on economic
intelligence.

To understand this requires an understanding

of the development of the new state of the Russian economy
and the transformation, or transmogrification, of many
Soviet institutions.
Developing the New Oligarchy Linkages
For the past few years, the gaining of personal wealth
has served as the nexus between the political elite, the KGB
and OC - - the "new oligarchy."

To further illustrate the

origins and propagation of this new oligarchy, let us
exaunine the development of the Soviet-Russian banking and
financial infrastructure.
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In order to facilitate the privatization process,
numerous banks sprouted up throughout Russia, many with the
help of government funds. * Typically, the Kremlin
appointed the bank presidents amd managers, who gained their
positions by way of their status in the patron-client system
that operates in Russia.

In line with this system, as

previously mentioned, the Kremlin then utilized the banks as
vehicles for transferring CCCP SU money and resources out of
the country.

These banks proved instrumental in providing

favorable loans amd business contracts to other government
clients as well.
During the early 1990s, most loans made by the Central
Bank of Russia were made on the instructions of either the
Russian parliament or top Kremlin officials (within the
Executive Branch)

Thus, stairt-up funds were provided by

the Kremlin to business enterprises with whom the government
formed JVs, in exchange for the credit.

This way, money

could be laundered by funnel ing it through a network of
corrupt bankers, KGB front companies and couriers, and into
lucrative investments and firms either in the West or under
the control of OC at home.
Typically, the KGB would set up a front company with
the loan money.

Often, the extent of this "company"

amounted to a temporary address, with the borrowed money
actually going to other endeavors as "payment of services
rendered," which services were in reality the transfer.
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investment, and management of ill-gotten funds, rather than
for the stated "start-up" business as originally designated.
Such was one method of robbing the state coffers.
Or, conversely, the banks amd the government teamed up.
Here, the banks acquired shares in the JV companies in
exchange for favoreUale loans to the government officials,
who because their partners.

Numerous government

officials, bankers, and businessmen, many of whom had
organized crime links, took advamtage of this governmental
"loans-for-shares" program.
One company, which German intelligence (BND) identified
as a former KGB spy asset during the cold war^^ and which
had from 1989-91 served as a channel for transferring state
resources out of the country, later formed a partnership
with the government using state money amd capital.

This was

accomplished in order to continue milking the state for
money and resources by gaining lucrative government
contracts with the intent to defraud the government of its
resources.

Such firms then used the stolen wealth to

purchase interests in valuable real estate, which,
ultimately, evolved into wealthy and "legitimate"
enterprises.

The money would thereby be laundered.

In

these types of situations, the KGB acted as the agent for
the government official and benefitted handsomely from it.
Or, conversely, it was the former KGB front company that
provided the start-up capital to the government official in
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excheuige for shares in the official's company or JV.
Whichever method was used, they each served the ultimate
purpose; mainly, the theft of state-owned resources.
Criminal Infiltration of Government
One type of common partnership that served as an avenue
for OC penetration of government involved investment firms
whose function was to "assist" in the privatization of
Soviet industry.

The method employed here was that the

government official conducting the privatization received
the start-up capital from the investment firm.

He then used

his position and contacts in government to introduce his new
investment partners, usually KGB and OC elements, into high
government circles and helped to build and strengthen their
ties.

By such methods, then, was influence-peddling

accomplished in post-Soviet Russia.
As these ties were forged throughout government, OC
elements increasingly infiltrated the higher levels of
business and government and built mutually profitable, even
though criminally corrupt, relationships with both the KGB
and the political elite.

Thus, the new and powerful

oligarchical relationship had been secured.

These

relationships became formalized by way of "democratic"
parlieunentary elections.
In the December 1995 parliamentary elections, many KGB
officers and organized criminals ran and won seats.
Ironically, those who ran for political office were immune
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from prosecution, which invited many financial-fraud type
criminals and questionable others to run for parliamentary
seats.

Many individuals took advantage of this legal

glitch, seeking election, particularly in the lower house,
the State Duma, specifically in order to avoid prosecution.
Indeed, some candidates were already under criminal
indictment.^*
The point is that, once seats were won, in turn, the
law-making process could be thwarted.

Not surprisingly,

through promises of investing illegally obtained riches into
their districts, seats were easily won by such candidates.
Of course, ceunpaign promises were rarely fulfilled.^®
It is not difficult to understand why laws affecting
participants in OC activities remain in "draft" form; such
laws remain unresolved because it benefits many legislators'
interests if they remain unresolved.

Those laws that had

been passed were ambiguous and often only exacerbated the
problems they were meant to resolve.

For example, the "Law

on Securities" that was adopted in April 1996 prescribed
norms for the transfer of rights to securities that could be
interpreted in different ways.

Moreover, instead of

facilitating the opening up of the securities market to new
investors, the law, instead, has resulted in barring their
entry."
Russia's organized criminals have amassed large enough
fortunes that they now command immense influence and can
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provide the greatest financial support to Russian political
elites amd candidates.

As such, organized criminals either

directly or indirectly control the government's domestic amd
foreign policy.

The ties are close, even intimate.

When OC

in a country becomes so powerful amd widespread that it
affects the government's behavior, not only domestically but
also in its foreign relations, it poses a threat not only to
the state and government that it exerts control over, but to
the entire world, especially the international business
community.
substantial.

The amounts of money changing hands are
An article in Forbes noted that between 1991-

1995, Russians had transferred at least $60 billion into
foreign bank accounts.^*

The possession of this level of

resources facilitates access to companies worldwide.
The Bamking Scams
Even though economic reforms were taking hold in Russia
as Yeltsin consolidated his power, by the end of 1992, many
reformers had been forced out of influential positions in
both the government and the KGB, and were replaced by hard
liners.

As a group of economists observed, even the Central

Bank was under the apparatchik's control.^*
reforms continued to progress.

Even so,

However, within this process

of change, it was OC structures, not democratic
institutions, that were becoming dominant throughout Russian
society.
Russian journalist Victor Semyonov reported that in the
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early 1990s many Russian banks went bemkrupt, often with
hundreds of billions of rubles "drifting" from one
collapsing bank to another, with each bank in this cycle
eventually collapsing.

These banks, he noted, came to be

called "ghost banks" because they seemed to be there, but in
essence, neither the bank nor the money actually existed.
Further, he noticed that, typically, bamk memagement would
claim that the bank went under not as a result of poor
management, but because it had been forced to do "good"
party work for the local Russian CPs.^°

It is, then, no

surprise that many banks went bankrupt since they were
simply used as the means by which capital was transferred
out of Russia and money was laundered by government
officials and their cronies.
Another common method used by city government
officials was to form a JV with a foreign partner, who would
be responsible for gaining the credit for the enterprise.
This method operated in the following manner: In advance,
the foreign partner would sign off the credited funds to the
city government official, who then would use his influence
to "lean on" the bank to provide the credit to the foreign
partner.

The bemk would then extend the credit emd transfer

the money to the foreign partner.

In other words, the money

was transferred into private coffers owned by the city
government official, and the foreign partner disappeared
with his cut.

The bank would seek out its money, ultimately
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imploring the city government for help; the city government
or the Duma "investigated" only to declare the contract as
fraudulent or unsound, resulting in the contract being
nullified.

For "undetermined" reasons (the Economic Crimes

Department of the Moscow police is investigating the case),
the bamk had decided not to take any further legal action
and simply accounted for its losses as a debt.

Thus, the

bank was defrauded emd the money was gone.^^
Another method, as described by Interior Minister
Anatoly Kulikov, operates as follows: a high government
official of some particular ministry would collude with a
bank's top management, as well as with other "Caucasian
nationalities," i.e., the mafia.*

They would then create a

fictitious stock company emd open an account for themselves
in a Russian commercial bemk.

They then would conclude an

agreement on the purchase of some items to be used by that
government ministry and that ministry would then transfer
the payment into the account.

In turn, the rubles were

turned into cash, converted into dollars, and sent to
private bank accounts.

To complement the whole process, the

'Interestingly, state security and militia leaders were
referring to the Chechens when they identified mafia members
or criminals as "Caucasians.” Naturally, it was the
Chechens that made convenient targets to blame the reunpant
crime on in Russia, and particularly in Moscow. As Amy
Knight noted, it has been the Yeltsin Administration's
policy to blame Russia's crime epidemic on the Chechens.
Indeed, the vast criminal Chechen mafia was used as
justification for the military invasions of the recalcitremt
republic, (Knight, Amy. Spies without Cloaks: The
KGB's Successors. 1996: 179-181).
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embezzlement was concealed by forging a confirmation of
receipt of the goods.
Numerous methods to defraud both the government emd
business, including the tremsfer of goods out of the country
and then simply writing them off as lost, uncollectible, bad
debt, etc. were, and continue to be employed on a grand
scale.

As such, emd to the detriment of the development of

viable economic institutions, numerous government-backed
banks and factories soon faced insolvency.
With schemes like these proliferating throughout
Russia, it becomes clearer as to why so many bankers have
increasingly fallen victim to contract hitmen.

Thus, the

symbiotic relationships between Russian political
leaders/elites, the KGB, and OC figures continued to
develop.
The ties that developed between those individuals and
groups who comprise the new oligarchy beceuae highly
intertwined through the privatization of the security and
intelligence services as the Soviet Union began to break up.
The numerous organizational changes that had occurred from
1991 to 1993 as the former KGB was "dismantled, " coupled
with the high demand for skilled security to protect the
banks and new businesses that formed as communism collapsed,
had led many chekists to leave or retire from official KGB
ranks to find more lucrative employment within the business
sector and private security services.^

They did so while
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retaining old ties emd contacts, applying the same chekist
technic[ues of operations employed by their communist
predecessors to the advantage of their own private business
pursuits, which more often than not, coincided with the
interests of organized criminals.
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CHAPTER 4
DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE
The global business environment of the 1990s meant new
and additional roles for the KGB to play.

The chekists*

infiltration and control of Russia's domestic economy
through their ties with the newly emerging bemking
oligarchy, their control of the private security services,
and their outright ownership and control of numerous
business enterprises and resources, ensured the secret
police's survival and growth even as other Soviet
institutions collapsed throughout the FSU.

Moreover, the

KGB's enduring role in the Russian political process, in
top-level decision-making, and Kremlin power struggles
mandated its survival as a major pillar of Russian politics
into the 21st century.

Hence, the legacy of Kremlin-secret

police symbiosis continues.
Indeed, with the 1995 broadening of the FSB's powers to
include not only counterintelligence but also
counterterrorism, fighting corruption and OC, and economic
security, chekist involvement in all aspects of Russian
society was assured.^
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The Explosive Growth of Private Security Services
The early 1990s evidenced extreme cutthroat competition
that ensued in the business sphere.

Seeing the

opportunities, many top KGB officers became partners with
owners of successful emd potentially successful business
ventures to gain control, in true KGB style, and to oversee
production of and manage the operations of these ventures
and, of course, to glean the profits.^
Through the utilization of its traditional tactics, the
KGB used its position to force out those entrepreneurs who
would not partner up: these entrepreneurs literally were
"set up" and arrested with their business being confiscated
and taken over by the KGB.^

Moreover, to aid in the control

of business, KGB protection rackets beccime widespread/*

As

such, through "offering" and providing protection, the KGB
extorted money from business owners.

Many wealthy Russian

entrepreneurs hired KGB agents to protect them from
organized criminals.^ Moreover, many organized criminals
operate protection services.
complex.

The situation is, indeed, very

Today, the majority of businesses in Russia must

pay bribes to operate, for protection rackets extort money
from the banks down to the street kiosk vendors.^

In 1996,

former CIA Director John Deutch testified to the Senate that
up to 80% of all private businesses in Russia pay extortion
fees.^

The coverage is close to complete.

Many chekists also formed private security services.
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Bemk management preferred to hire former KGB officers to
provide security and bodyguard services because they had the
most refined skills necessary to protect their patrons.
Further, the KGB had the contacts and networks to act as
couriers and they had information - - the knowledge of how
to get it, where to get it, amd how to use it against
competitors emd opposition.

Thus, since OC controlled the

majority of banks in Russia, the KGB begem working directly
for OC.®
In addition, organized criminals had infiltrated
numerous banks through the private security services as part
of their effort to strengthen their control over prospective
victims.®

The KGB emd OC colleüaorated to work for identical

institutions, and their own enrichment, to the detriment of
the honest citizen.

Corruption became so entrenched that by

1996 the Prosecutor General's Office had rated banking to be
the most criminal sector of the economy.
With organized criminals controlling the banking and
financial sectors of Russia, money-laundering and fraud are
conducted on a grand scale.

However, Russiem law

enforcement agencies fail to arrest or prosecute bankers - for both political and logistical reasons.

As Soviet and

post-Soviet crime specialist Louise Shelley points out,
"Existing Russian law enforcement is no match for the
private bank security forces staffed by former KGB
operatives.
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Symbiosis and Political Intrigue
By 1993, many KGB front compamies had been trams formed
into dominamt actors in Russian society, some in reward for
securing the political elites' stolen wealth overseas,
others through gaining lucrative contracts by bribing
government officials; these entities have achieved great
political significance because of their wealth and
influence.

Although corruption became widespread throughout

both reformist amd hard-line political circles, the rift
between them still intensified as each struggled to hold and
increase their own power and wealth.
Furthermore, as a result of the privatization of many
former KGB officers, conflicts between political rivals
inevitaüsly led to conflicts between the privately and the
officially controlled chekists.

For example, in December

1994, Yeltsin sent members of his Korzhakov-led elite guards
unit to raid Most Bank in Moscow in what is believed to have
been am attempt to intimidate his political rival, Moscow
Mayor Yuri Luzhkov.

Luzhkov maintained a large Moscow city

budget account there and, moreover, was rumored to be the
real control behind the bank, only using his close
associate, Vladimir Goussinsky, (a part owner of the bank)
as a front man.^^

Goussinsky had called upon the local FSK

(the renamed Moscow KGB, which is under the control of the
Moscow mayor, Luzhkov himself), for help but Yeltsin's
forces (under Korzhakov), triumphed in the armed
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confrontation that followed.
Here, Yeltsin had blatemtly used the KGB as a tool of
intimidation in an attempt to bring down his political
opposition, just as his communist predecessors had done.

In

doing so, Yeltsin, a product of the Soviet system himself,
ensured the continuation of the politicization of the state
security forces, and has, in fact, used them increasingly in
order to stay in power.
Soon after the showdown at Most Bank, in an attempt to
better control the communications, financial, and
informational transactions of Russia's banks, emd "to
intensify the fight against organized crime," Yeltsin issued
a decree "Concerning the Organs of Federal Government
Communications and Information," conferring all
communications and electronic transfers to FAPSI'S
jurisdiction.1*

Therefore, FAPSI, which is responsible

directly to Yeltsin, gained responsibility for overseeing
and issuing permits to banks and other economic entities
that use data lines and electronic fund transfers to move
money.

Furthermore, FAPSI officially gained a monopoly over

economic information, which is of great strategic value,
particularly since the organization monitors both public and
private communications.
Moreover, in an effort to coordinate the multiple
security services conducting telephone surveillance, in
early 1996, a decree "On the Control of Manufacturers and
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Users of Special Technical Devises Designed to Receive
Information Secretly" was drafted to give overall
coordination to the FSB.

According to a Yeltsin

Administration official, the decree was adopted because the
situation "had gotten way out of hamd."^®

Indeed, the

owners and managers of mamy banks amd highly-profitaüale
businesses employ their o%m intelligence forces to monitor
their political and economic competition.

For example, one

Russiam businessman, Boris Berezovsky, claimed that his
security force included 20 KGB technical surveillance
specialists who tap the mobile phones of key government and
business players, among others.^®
Contract Killings
As the new oligarchy gained control of much of the
Russian economy, killings of businessmen in the streets of
Moscow and other urban areas reached an unprecedented level.
In 1993, according to the Russian Interior Ministry, there
were 102 contract killings of businessmen.
number had soared to 562.^^

By 1994, the

According to former Minister of

the Interior Gen. Viktor Yerin, during the first quarter of
1994 alone, there had been an average of 84 murders a day,
most of which were contract killings arising from the
struggle for markets.^®

Further, according to a report of

Prosecutor Gen. Yuri Skuratov, from 1990 to 1995 the murder
rate doubled; in 1995 alone, there were over 31,000 cases of
unsolved murders, nearly half of which involved businessmen.
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while close to 40% involved killings in which the victims
were OC leaders.^®

The numbers continued to spiral.

In

1996, there was a total of 640 suspected contract killings,
roughly 90% of which went unsolved.^®

Contract killers also

executed mamy bankers and political officials.

So, too,

mamy journalists who chose to cover OC activities or speak
out against bank operations were killed.
Many believed that the KGB was behind the killings.
The head of the Russian Committee to Protect Journalists,
Oleg Panfilov, suspected that out of 42 serious attacks on
journalists in 1995, at least half were instigated by
government officials.

Indeed, it is perceptions like these

that have sabotaged many commitments the Russian media may
have had to actualize a truly free press in Russia.
Such vicious attacks have generated widespread fear
among Russian journalists to publish any unbiased articles
on crime and corruption, or to editorialize against banks
and OC.

One contract involved a newspaper owner/parliament

member who was killed after his newspaper published a list
of nauaes of top "thieves-in-law."^^

Notaüaly, many

journalists were targeted when their coverage became
"uncomfortaible" to powerful interests.
According to the Minister of the Interior, the high
cost of hiring elite killers can only be paid by powerful
and wealthy interests.

The cost of a hit normally ranges

from $20,000 to $50,000, reaching to a peaik rate of
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$100,000.

Furthermore, the Interior Minister asserted that

the top killers were "as a rule former sabotage experts of
the Main Intelligence Departments of the Defence Ministry or
of the First Main Department of the KGB."

Their targets

consisted of "big bankers, industrialists, and 'sharks' of
the criminal world"^*
Indeed, it has been found that many contract killings
were in fact fulfilled by both KGB officers and "militarytypes" (GRU), utilizing the private security services and
detective and protection offices which were operated by the
KGB; such access allowed for the necessary avenues to
investigate emd surveil targets in preparation for the kill
and also helped camouflage the identity of the assailant.
Moreover, many former special forces soldiers and KGB agents
work directly for OC groups, who pay off local law
enforcement agencies, which have become highly
criminalized.^^

Deputy Police Chief Boris Kondrashov said

that in Moscow alone, there had been some 960 officers
dismissed in 1995 while 2000 more awaited trial for
corruption.^®

It is for these reasons that most crimes

remain unsolved and, further, more extreme methods are
increasingly being employed to fulfill the murder contracts.
According to Mikhail Slinko, formerly of the General
Prosecutor's Department of Organized Crime and Murder
Investigations, since 1993, the use of explosive devices to
fulfill contract murders has become a "specific criminal
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problem".^®

It was reported that in the first five months

of 1993, there were more than 40 cases of explosives being
used for criminal purposes.^®

In one June 1996 sweep alone,

Moscow police seized 3920 pounds of explosives.®^
While official law enforcement was supposed to be
operating according to new, however confusing, penal codes,
the private security services operated with impunity for no
meaningful laws governing them existed.

In 1992, the "Law

on Private Detective and Security Activity" was passed.

It

prohibited single enterprises from conducting both detective
and security functions; as a result, the private security
services simply formed subsidiaries, separating the two
functions.

This law is largely ineffective in controlling

the services' activities; indeed, legal constraints are more
lacking in the private arena than those that have been
codified for official state security forces.
It is very plausible that many contract killings
originate within government circles.

As Gen. Vladimir

Rushailo, head of the Moscow Regional Agency for Combating
OC (RAOC), which is responsible for arresting and
prosecuting specific OC groups such as the "thieves - in-law"
and offenses involving official corruption noted, if a
"thief-in-law" is caught, he "is not afraid of going to
prison because he knows he will be well off there."
However, a corrupt official possesses a very, strong fear of
losing his position of power, and therefore, as Rushailo
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concludes, "he is prepared to take resolute steps."®®

And,

indeed, it makes sense that government officials were and
are often the financiers of contract killings.

Moreover, it

is government officials (nomenklatura and KGB), in addition
to the organized criminals, that hold vast interests in
private enterprise in Russia.
The Ambiguous Legal Design
The RAOC, like other Russian agencies responsible for
fighting OC, is for the most part made impotent due to the
fact that any real laws or even courts to conduct criminal
proceedings simply do not exist in any meaningful way.

In

one case, in 1996, a psychiatric evaluation for a murder
suspect lasted four minutes and took place in the hallway
outside the courtroom.®*
any respect for law.

Such procedures do not promote

The dean of the Moscow State Legal

Academy, Oleg E. Kutafin, clarified the point when he stated
that "laws and rights by themselves mean nothing if there
isn 't an economic and social structure to enforce them".®®
Moreover, procedures to enforce the law, which itself
is ambiguous, remain unclear and unrealistic.

For example,

on January 1, 1997, a new penal code went into effect.
However, the new economic crimes the code lists are "so
cunbiguously defined that it will be virtually impossible to
bring wrongdoers to justice."

For instance, it is now a

crime to "illegally receive or disseminate commercial
secrets" - but what constitutes a commercial secret is not
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addressed.

Honey-laundering "on a large scale" is now

punishable by up to 10 years in prison, as is confiscation
of property - but "large scale" is undefined.®®

The law

cannot very well be enforced, particularly within the
economic sphere, when figures on trade, teuc collection,
budgets, currency reserves, and, for that matter, any
statistics whatsoever are inaccurate.

Furthermore, no

central authority exists to gather such information and
there is no official government cooperation or funds
appropriated to develop and institutionalize a process to
collect the data, let alone evaluate it.®^®®
The economic information that is being gathered
consists of that which the KGB-operated private security
services collect on potential business partners, on
competition, in credit assessments, etc., for themselves,
their patrons, and their clients.

Realizing that they could

market their knowledge of espionage tradecraft, many of the
privatized KGB officers took on additional tasks of engaging
in economic intelligence and counterintelligence, providing
information as a vital part of their services.®®
As the demand for these types of services increased,
many KGB officers branched out from the private security
services and set up consultant firms to put together deals
and work the system for foreign clients and JV partners, who
were uneüale to operate in the new Russian business
environment where knowing the right people and paying bribes
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are mandated for success.

In eui environment where OC

controls almost all banking emd business, teuces are
exorbitant, significant legal structures vis-a-vis business
emd most other spheres eure lacking, and law-enforcement
officials teüce bribes instead of fighting crime, emy foreign
investor would be lost in ambiguities.
In fact, the system is designed so that foreign
investors will be uneüole to accomplish emything unless they
hire the services of the KGB, (i.e. private security
services), to assist them.

The old Russian saying, "The law

in Russia is like a Icunp-post.

You cem always get around

it"*° is made to ring true with the aid of the KGB.
Yeltsin-appointed former Economic Minister Yegor Gaidar
accurately described the Russian business environment when
he observed in 1995 that the success of an enterprise often
depends on whether the manager pays bribes, obtains
privileges, and develops "sufficiently high patrons.*®

Even

so, the Kremlin leadership plays a key role in maintaining
this environment, as it greatly assures Yeltsin's continued
power through the critical support he receives by
accommodating wealthy business interests.
Yeltsin has built up a very powerful security and
intelligence apparatus, much of which is answerable directly
to him.

In other words, he has gained KGB support in his

bid to hold power by providing numerous concessions to the
chekists.

Indeed, in order to gain the security and
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intelligence organizations' support during a period of great
unrest and instability within Russia, Yeltsin has further
bolstered KGB powers through a smoke screen of a forceful
drive to fight crime amd corruption.
The Crime and Corruption Campaign
Ironically, KGB powers and ranks have been increasing
since 1991 under the auspices of an urgent need to fight
crime and corruption.*^

However, in reality, the only top-

level criminal elements rooted out are those who refuse to
cooperate with the KGB; these end up either dead or in jail.
One report stated that between 1993-95, Korzhakov's SBP
organized the contract killings of close to 25% of top
"thieves-in-law" leaders.*®

Further, it was indicated that

the aim had been to punish those who extorted government
officials instead of cooperating with them in their illegal
business schemes.

Both Korzhakov and former GUO-head tuimed

FSB-head Barsukov had worked closely with Yeltsin to ensure
his hold on power emd to further his goals.

(Whether

Yeltsin was aware of specific killings is beyond the scope
of this paper).
Furthermore, those former chekists who took on the
Kremlin when a KGB-brokered deal went sour would ultimately
lose out.

For exemple, one ex-KGB major was jailed as a

result of a conflict with FSB-chief Barsukov that arose over
a deal involving the KGB front company the KGB officer was
operating and an agreement with Barsukov to supply
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surveillemce equipment to the FSB.

Later, Barsukov broke

the contract and when the KGB officer sought reparations, he
was jailed.**

Thus, the campaign to fight crime emd

corruption is indeed very selective.
The system is designed to facilitate Kremlin control of
both political and economic adversaries.

For example, the

controversial 1994 law "On The Urgent Measures To Defend The
Population Against Gangsterism And Other Kinds of Organized
Crime," outlined in the report on "The New Stage of the
Fight with Organized Crime in Russia,"*^ provides for
warrantless invasions of privacy and detention up to 30 days
under mere suspicion, thus eneUaling Russian security and
intelligence officers to legally go after opposition and
competition in the neume of "fighting organized crime."*®
Thereby, Yeltsin ensured political non-interference in the
criminal endeavors of those chekists and their networks that
supported him, which, by 1993 were entrenched in all memner
of criminal enterprises throughout the country.

Moreover,

the Kremlin provides safeguards for many enterprises that
are currently under firm OC control; that is, if their
owners and executives do not join Yeltsin's political
opposition but, instead, contribute to his political support
base.
The reality is that Yeltsin has given free rein to the
KGB's successors to engage in bribery and extortion, conduct
illegal business, ignore legalities, etc., in exchange for
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support and assistance in carrying out political intrigues
in the Kremlin.

After all, his goal is to stay in power,

not an easy feat in an environment of perennial power
struggles within top political circles, where political
ploys are a constant part of the scene.
Surveillance Within Russiam Society
As the successor to the former KGB SCO, the FSB is
responsible for counterintelligence and domestic security.
Indeed, the search for spies among the Russian populace
continues.

The activities and contacts of foreigners

visiting amd living in Russia are vigilantly monitored by
the KGB's successors.

However, the mass Russian populace no

longer fears arrest and interrogation as the automatic
result of any acquaintances with foreigners.*^
Nevertheless, the Russian populace is not immune from the
FSB's surveillance.

A Russian law faculty survey indicated

that 7.5 million Russians had their telephones illegally
tapped in 1995.*®

According to a Moscow News report, every

district telephone station in Moscow has a special room with
up to 50 people working per shift who are "selectively" or
"constantly" conducting telephone surveillance and, further,
intercepting phone conversations.*®
As the domestic intelligence service incrementally
regained its powers, so too, its calls for vigilance against
foreign spies became louder.

By June 1996, FSB-chief

Kovalev was declaring "an unprecedented growth of foreign
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intelligence activity" in Russia.®®

A report that surfaced

about the same time as Kovalev's statement of concern noted
that, according to Yeltsin, eleven foreigners had been
expelled from Russia in 1995, 28 Russiems had been arrested
for espionage, and 67 attempts to pass secrets to
(presumably) foreign intelligence services had been thwarted
by the Russian security services.®®
Indeed, in June 1997, FSB-chief Kovalev went on
television to offer extra pay any Russians spying for
foreign powers; all they had to do was become double agents
for Moscow.
you anyway."

Further, he added, "Don't call, and we'll find
A phone number for the purpose of contacting a

duty officer answering calls on the hotline was provided.®®
Moreover, foreign diplomats and suspected foreign
agents are kept under close surveillance.

In 1997, U.S.

officials discovered that the security of the American
Embassy (the old building is embedded with uncountable bugs)
in Moscow had again been seriously penetrated.

The April

1997 penetration has been described as "an inauspicious
episode" in light of the super-heavy security that exists at
the complex as work to build four new floors, two of which
are hoped to be edasolutely secure, is underway.

A reporter

for the New York Times wrote that an AWOL Russian soldier
had slipped into the Acting U.S. Ambassador's residence,
spent the night, and was discovered the next day teücing a
shower there.®®

Much to the chagrin of American officials.
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the Russian intelligence services continue to compromise the
security of U.S. diplomatic buildings in Moscow.
Even though post-Soviet Russian society has opened up
to some extent and people speak out much more freely, fear
of the security services is still, nevertheless, prevalent.
For example, in December 1994, there was a report indicating
that some Russian soldiers who had been captured in Chechnya
were afraid to return home because of the presence amd
possible questioning by the FSK (later renamed the FSB).®*
And in an area closer to home, Mikhail Dubitsky, a
security officer at Global One, (a telecom consortium),
stated that, "Russiam hackers are terrified of getting mixed
up with the mafia or running afoul of our secret services.
Maybe that's why our hackers tend to break into systems that
are located aüaroad.

They know that in Russia they'll be

dealt with Russian style."®®
The KGB's successors' continuous calls for vigilance
against foreign spies demonstrates the pervasive chekist
mindset that persists and is felt within every sector of
post-Soviet Russian society.

Today, in Russia, many citizen

groups, non-profit organizations, and other civic groups
that formed during glasnost, and through the 1990s, for the
most part operate freely, without much interference from the
security services.

Even though most of these groups are

struggling to survive in the face of severe economic
hardships, and rarely have a significant voice, much less
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effect the political process, a KGB successor agency still
monitors them.

According to an article in the Los Angeles

Times, this chekist agency "blurts an occasional warning
that their U.S. funding threatens Russian national
security."®®

As long as these organizations remain

ineffective and without significant funding, the chekists
will most likely not intervene in their activities.
The Russian people have not freed themselves fully from
the repressive grasp of the secret police.

Until the public

demands the liberty to espouse opposing political
viewpoints, until public officials recognize civil rights
and other freedoms, including the right to private property,
the new oligarchy will continue to control the states'
resources and, hence, deprive the mass public of its right
to a decent life and a share in their nation's wealth.
Moreover, the secret police will continue to thwart the
process of democratization that began in what was hoped by
millions of people in the former Soviet Union to be the end
of the "Soviet way of life."
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CHAPTER 5
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
The New Global Environment
Russia's foreign intelligence service, in contrast to
its domestic intelligence, was subjected to an entirely
different set of conditions under which it had to operate
following communism's demise.

Indeed, with communism dead,

the KGB PCD faced the loss of an ideological mission.

The

effect on foreign intelligence was much greater than that on
domestic intelligence since the espionage apparatus relied
much more heavily on ideology to motivate its officers and
agents, providing them with a strong sense of purpose that
served to justify their deeds in their own minds and drove
them to recruit others.
While the domestic KGB had basically served as a
repressive machine to keep strict order among the populace,
while protecting the power of the communist regime from
subversion from within, the foreign intelligence service had
worked to "spread the revolution."

This loss of mission,

coupled with the exposure of the secret police's past
crimes, led many of the KGB's foreign intelligence officers
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and agents to become disillusioned with the old Soviet
system and their role in supporting and furthering the cause
of what had been a self-serving emd woefully corrupt regime;
consequently, defections from the intelligence service were
widespread. ^ Those officers that remained with the
political police faced a "new Russia" that posed conflicting
perceptions of what the KGB successor agency's mission was
to be in a greatly changed world.
Not only did the KGB face a loss of a political
ideological mission, it also had to deal with a new economic
system.

Russia's transformation, in the wake of communism's

demise, from a command to a free-market economy more
completely changed the nature of the Russian intelligence
service than any other factor.

Moreover, communism's

collapse throughout the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
meant that Russia's foreign intelligence service lost a
large portion of its cash budget^ (particularly monies that
had poured in from communist satellites throughout the cold
war) ; it lost the support of numerous allies, which meant,
more importantly, that it no longer enjoyed the liaison
with, and access to close to 150 sigint stations within
former Warsaw Pact countries ;^ and it lost other benefits
derived from its former close relationships with numerous
other communist state and Soviet bloc intelligence services.
Nevertheless, Russia's transforming economy provided
the chekists the opportunity to exploit the situation to
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their advantage.

As discussed, many KGB officers from the

former KGB PCD formed JVs with Western companies emd
businessmen whom were eager to do business eurid maüce profits
in the new capitalist Russia.

The role of "businessman"

provided the perfect cover for the "former" KGB officers.
Moreover, beyond serving as a potential means of laundering
money, building partnerships with Western firms provided the
chekists access to that firm's particular industry emd,
hence, its technology and secrets.
Just as the INO had utilized trading companies in the
1920s as an espionage base,^^ now the SVR utilized business
enterprises, mostly JVs, in the 1990s for the same purpose
and in a similar manner.

The difference is that SVR

officers now spied on the West to enrich themselves, not the
state; they now had and have a personal stake in their
spying success that is astonishingly different than it had
been during Soviet rule, and one that has been potentially
much more lucrative.

The KGB-SVR's place within the new

oligarchy and its officers' linkages with 00 and, further,
their patrons who enjoy official government positions, have
successfully transferred control and ownership of the former
Soviet state's wealth to their own private coffers; this has
occurred at the expense of the mass Russian public, which
continues to suffer under the new system, to a larger degree
than it had under communism.
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In addition to its loss of influence within its own
"sphere of influence," the Soviet Union lost much of its
international political influence and, therefore, numerous
clients, which, in turn, was followed by the breakdown of
many of its espionage networks in other areas of the world.
As such, the Russian foreign intelligence service has been
struggling to rebuild its fragmented spy networks, and
regain its access to foreign markets, particularly arms
markets, and achieve its former superpower status.

Russia's

espionage efforts not only continue, but have escalated, as
the Russian foreign intelligence services (specifically, the
SVR and GRU) strive to undermine the West and thwart U.S.
hegemony.
Contrary to the claim that the KGB "no longer exists",
in reality, the foreign section of the former KGB is simply
operating under a new neune - the SVR.

As far back as 1992,

when most of the world viewed Russia as "no longer a
threat," SVR-chief Primeücov was assuring students of
intelligence at the Moscow Institute of International
Relations that even as Russia was experiencing rapid
changes, its foreign intelligence remained "up to the
mark."®

As many high-level decision-makers in the West were

becoming more relaxed eibout their concern over the Russian
intelligence services' activities immediately following
communism's demise, Primakov was stressing to these students
that it was important to "trace processes in the United
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States and other countries that could objectively lead to a
certain destabilization of the situation.
The Center for Security Policy reported in 1994 that
one of the mamy Soviet-style intelligence operations being
operated against the U.S. was, "the exploitation by Russian
intelligence of the relaxed post-Cold War atmosphere amd
reduced U.S. vigilance on security matters to recruit
"sleepers" —

agents in place who will be activated as the

need subsequently arises."®

Russian foreign intelligence

activities in the U.S. have continued virtually unabated,
and, further, as Washington officials have confirmed, have
increased since the collapse of communism.®

The SVR's

efforts in the U.S. will be discussed later in the chapter.
Just as the cold war's end required a reorientation of
Western intelligence services, so, too, Russian foreign
intelligence shifted its orientation; at least, that was the
official version from the Kremlin.

Moscow claimed that the

growing threats of OC, terrorism, nuclear proliferation,
drug trafficking, money laundering, and economic crimes had
become the larger priorities for its security and
intelligence services to fight.

But rather than fight these

threats, the SVR, instead, has fueled them.

Evidence has

shown that these types of activities have only escalated, in
their number and degree; Russian security and intelligence
officers have engaged in wide-ranging criminal behaviors for
their own self-fulfilling purposes.

More recently, it has
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been reported that some former KGB officers work for both
the SVR and Russian organized crime.

This "discovery" was

no surprise to many people, paurticularly the cynical Russian
populace.
The true priorities of Russia's foreign intelligence
service are economic, industrial, technological, and
political espionage, the reintegration of the "near abroad,"
and the negotiation of lucrative arms deals.

As such, the

SVR is waging a new industrial/economic espionage offensive
against the West.

In accordance with the fact that domestic

and foreign events are inherently linked, so, too, are
Russian domestic and foreign intelligence objectives.
Since the ability to operate in the current Russian
business/economic environment is crucial to the success of
virtually any enterprise in Russia today, as J. Michael
Waller observed, many KGB officers do not attempt to
camouflage their professional intelligence careers by
assuming a cover, as they had done during the Soviet years.
Instead, they advertise their chekist affiliations, offering
their knowledge of spy tradecraft as an added feature of
their services available to private businesses.
In conducting their investigations and in their work
under the guise of private security services, KGB officers
research company histories in order to evaluate their
potential for service as vehicles to gain (secret)
information.

In other words, they seek to identify
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businesses that could maüce worthwhile espionage targets.
Further, assessments as to the viability of developing
partnerships with targeted foreign companies are made.

If

history provides us any lesson, the SVR endeavors to
purchase certain proprietaries; that is, cost-effective
analysis is employed to determine whether purchasing a firm
is cheaper than efforts to steal the desired information.
Obviously, this scenario poses an ominous espionage threat
to governments and private businesses.
The chekists not only "protect" businesses (under the
cover of private security services) in Russia but are also
partners in them, particularly those which are highly
profitable.

To compete in a global market that is

increasingly dependent on the efficient use of information
technology, where businesses are required to utilize hightech computers and software programs to gain market share,
it only makes sense that, lacking this technology, a
priority of the KGB-operated side of the JVs must be the
acquisition of Western technology; this, of course, is
acquired through espionage.
of the JVs) "raison d'etre."

It is their (the Russian side
To acquire it legally would

take great sums of money and years of research and
development.

Inevitably, the JVs, particularly when located

on foreign soil, are utilized as fronts for espionage, money
laundering, spy recruiting, and to target, assess, and
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access industries in which technology and trade secrets may
be acquired.
The Drivers of the Espionage Offensive
The vital need for industrial technology to aid the
ailing Russian economy has been the Russian government's
impetus for the espionage offensive currently being waged by
SVR officers, in addition to the potential attainment of
great increases in the officers' own personal wealth.

So,

too, the need for economic information to aid the Russians
in gaining market share in a highly competitive world, now
that their economic system has chemged from a central to a
capitalist, if only a nascent capitalist one, also drives
the espionage effort.
The West has witnessed a Kremlin-orchestrated assault
on the privacy of its corporate secrets on a worldwide
scale.

Indeed, there has been an accelerated increase in

Russian espionage activities.

Not only is defense-related

technology sought, in addition, more recently, it is
industrial, economic, and proprietary information that is
being sought by the Russian intelligence services on a grand
scale.
In recognizing this increased threat, in its Annual
Report to Congress on Foreign Intelligence Collection and
Industrial Espionage, published in July 1995, the National
Counterintelligence Center (NACIC) reported that
"traditional espionage methods primarily reserved for

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

104
collecting national defense information are now being
applied to collect economic emd proprietary information."^^
Law and Functions of Foreign Intelligence
Concurrent with Yeltsin's January 1996 appointment of
SVR-head Primakov to the post of Foreign Minister, and his
replacement as chief of foreign intelligence with Primakov's
first deputy. Col. Gen. Vyacheslav Trubnikov, Yeltsin signed
a new "Law on Foreign Intelligence," which had been passed
by the Duma a few days earlier, in December 1995.

It

appears that the law was passed in order to provide SVR
officers with clear mission objectives emd a concise
understanding of their goals; and further, to "legitimize"
their operations, particularly within the economic sphere.
In addition to codifying the status and functions of
the SVR," there was written into this law a noticeable
emphasis on economic intelligence and espionage.

New deputy

SVR-head Scherbakov outlined SVR objectives within the
economic intelligence sphere; these were, to assess foreign
influence on Russia's economy, to facilitate integration
within the former USSR, to forestall foreign threats to
Russia's economic security, to assist the government in
attracting foreign investment, and to thwart moneylaundering activities of foreign and domestic criminal
groups.

Further, he asserted that the SVR would play a

major role in overseeing Russian arms deals through its
analysis of the international arms market and, furthermore.
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provide advice to Russian suppliers and manufacturers
concerning various middlemen.
The extensive list of tasks outlined here covers merely
one sphere, the economic.

Russia's foreign intelligence

service is responsible for carrying out wide-ranging emd
complex operations and activities, which demand the use of a
great amount of intelligence resources.

The SVR's tasks are

not limited to economic espionage but also include
political, industrial, computer, technological, emd defenserelated espionage.
In today's mostly non-communist world, a different
world that faces more diversified threats than those posed
during the cold war, the SVR's priorities changed
accordingly.

Hence, beyond those already mentioned, the

SVR's responsibilities now further include fighting the
proliferation of nuclear weapons, drug and arms trafficking,
money-laundering, international OC, ethnic uprisings,
economic crime, and the promotion of "reintegration" with
the "near abroad."

Notably, many of these functions have a

"law-enforcement" tint to them, which tasks had
traditionally been left to the regular police.

However, to

justify the continuation of its massive budget, and to
provide its officers with a new sense of purpose to replace
the "spread of the revolution," the foreign intelligence
service ed)sorbed these additional tasks.

Conveniently, in

performing these traditional "law enforcement tasks," the
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SVR increased its ability to gather intelligence and engage
in and coordinate its espionage, as its reach was thereby
extended.

In turn, its power and control also increased.

KGB-Organized Crime Collaboration in Espionage
The problem that confronts the world, particularly the
world of international business, is that the SVR is actually
working with the organized criminals in many spheres, more
particularly within the economic sector.

As discussed

previously, memy former KGB officers now work for OC-run
banks and, more importantly, maintain their ties with the
Russian intelligence services.

Both OC figures^^ and

"former" KGB officers engage in protection rackets.

Hence,

there is obviously some OC-SVR collaboration in gaining
economic intelligence to the benefit of the enterprises that
are jointly (OC-KGB) operated.

As such, organized criminals

aid the intelligence officers' espionage efforts for mutual
benefit.

In many arenas, the organized criminals and

Russian intelligence officers enjoy a lucrative, symbiotic
relationship.
As Amy Knight speculates, the high numbers of former
foreign intelligence officers who now work for privatized
firms such as banks very likely gain and use intelligence
service-related inside information for the benefit of these
private f i r m s . T h u s , Russian foreign intelligence is
working for private business interests.
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This intimate link between Russian business and
intelligence has fueled the SVR's global propaganda effort
comparing itself with the CIA" within the "democratic"
realm.

However, unlike the Russian foreign intelligence

service, the CIA does not gather and provide economic
intelligence to one major corporation one day and another
the next, for, to do so, presents the American capitalist
system with a problem: that is, how to determine which
individual or firm gets the intelligence while keeping the
playing field level.
The post-communist world is distinguished by global
trade and the search for markets.

The development and

widespread application of high-end information technology
has opened up many economies to new vulnerabilities.
Specifically, many Western societies have become computer
and software driven, resulting in a new dependency and,
hence, a new vulnerability.
As computer security expert Peter E. Sakkas observes,
"a dangerous level of exposures to terrorist activity,
sabotage, and espionage exists in the political-economic
security of world trade, international finance and global
business."

He points out that "the increasing globalization

of computer networks has increased their vulnereUaility to
potential attacks."" Sakkas contended that the "Osnaz"
forces, which, during the cold war, had operated under the
control of the KGB and had been used as the KGB's terrorist
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apparatus, may otter their software emd computer knowledge
to commercial enterprises, terrorist orgemizations, and
criminal syndicates in order to meüce a living in the 1990s.
Seückas* contention is quite valid in light of the
Russiem government's growing economic crisis situation, emd
its resultant ineUbility to pay its militeury forces, public
servants, educators, scientists, workers, and pensioners.
Moreover, the types of skills these "Osnaz" forces possess
are currently in high demand, greatly increasing the
likelihood that OC groups emd terrorist organizations will
become even more sophisticated as the world enters the 21st
century.
Sakkas observes that cooperation between former Soviet
agents and international criminal organizations "is ominous
because it exponentially extends their power and influence
in the white-collar world.""

Evidently, in 1991, KGB Maj .

Gen. Vyacheslav Artomov told David Wise,

(an intelligence

writer and author of the recent book on CIA turncoat Aldrich
Ames, Wightmover) ^ that "the policy of the present bosses
[of Directorate Z] is that these people [wire-tap
technicians] should not be made pariahs.

If you force them

into a tight comer, people with these skills can join all
sorts of M a f i a s . R o g u e states, lacking state-of-the-art
expertise in this field, surely seek to "rent the brains
to achieve their goals, whether they be of a conventional
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terrorist nature, a "new breed" terrorist v a r i e t y , o r
nuclear weapons seeking.
Computer security expert Wayne Madsen points out that,
"the major targets for state-sponsored computer espionage
are industrial and technological s e c r e t s . F o r example, he
noted that the Hannover computer espionage ring, which made
hundreds of attempts to penetrate U.S. military and other
computer systems, some of which were successful, had been
recruited by the KGB in Berlin in 1985.

These spies

received payment in the form of drugs and money.

However,

four years later, in 1989, the West Germem
Bundeskriminalalamant (BKA) arrested the ring's members for
engaging in espionage for the KGB.^"*

Surely, this was not

an isolated cell, particularly with the phenomenal growth of
computer systems and application technology throughout the
late 1980s and 1990s.
The French SDECE, in 1983, obtained KGB Department T
(technology) documents indicating that 2.4% of Soviet
espionage operations involved computer h a c k i n g . N o doubt,
this percentage has soared, particularly as has the
development of the global communications network, the
Internet, and access to computer emd phone lines world-wide.
Indeed, Russian intelligence officers and agents can engage
in espionage against the West from Europe, Asia, and
elsewhere in the world (wherever a computer and
communications link are available), and, thus, can more
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easily avoid physical surveillance or prosecution from
Western counterintelligence, making the threat even more
insidious.
Even though Russia does not produce its own computer
chips, its capabilities within the computer sphere are welldeveloped.

According to Madsen's list of "Computer-

Communications Espionage Capabilities of Intelligence and
Law Enforcement Agencies," Russia and the CIS show the top
capabilities rating of " e x c e l l e n t . M u c h of Russia's
ability to develop weapons is a consequence of its
technological espionage offensives and exploitations.

For

example, in 1997, the Russian government managed to get a
U.S. firm to export two supercomputers, thus greatly
increasing its capabilities within the weapons testing and
development sphere."
On February 27,28, 1996, the U.S. House Banking
Committee, chaired by Jeunes Leach (R-IA), exeunined the
threat from counterfeiting, credit card fraud, and bank
theft over global banking networks.^®

The committee

concluded that many of these types of sceuns are tied to
international OC networks.

The FBI's Moscow office, which

was established in 1994, estimated then that there were 5600
OC groups with 100,000 active members in the FSU.

Further,

officials estimated that 300 Soviet gangs had moved abroad,
with at least 24 of them moving to American cities.

In

1995, the FBI's Moscow office uncovered a computerized
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embezzlement scheme involving Russians that had drained more
than $8 million from a U.S. bank."
Russian OC groups, in fact, have phenomenal eunounts of
cash and have formed alligmces with other OC groups,
particularly the Italiems emd Colombians."

For the first

time, in 1994, DBA agents uncovered evidence of Russian OC
collusion with traditional American mafia families."
Contrary to the SVR's stated commitments of cooperation with
the West in fighting the international OC problem, it has
only cooperated in order to l e a m what evidence U.S.
officials have uncovered of Russian OC activity.

As Louise

Shelley pointed out, when a Russian delegation met with U.S.
authorities to discuss evidence gained through wiretaps,
(which remained in place), upon the delegates' return to
Russia, the stream of information being thereby acquired
emruptly ended."
In another exemple of Russian OC collaboration with
other OC groups, ties between Russian OC and Mexican mafia
members can be inferred to exist from the recent January
1997 Justice Department indictment of 15 people in a freon
smuggling operation.

According to George Weise,

Commissioner of the U.S. Customs Service, "There are
indications of major smuggling operations in Texas [and]
California, some of which involve Russian OC and are
transcontinental in scope."®®

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

112
Officials say that the product has been smuggled into
the U.S. along the same routes used by major drug
traffickers.

Evidently, one identified source of the

smuggled freon is Russia, where its transfer originates.
The product is later shipped through Mexico and Canada to
America.®^
Weise said that there had been a "dramatic shift in
smuggling from Miami to Mexico and, further, that some of
the bigger smuggling rings appear to involve Russiam OC.®®
There appears to be collusion between Russian OC amd the
Mexicam mafia here, which probably extends into other
spheres, such as drug trafficking, as well.
Emigres
The Russian secret police have historically monitored
emigres.

Upon the Soviet Union's demise, travel amd

emigration outside Russia's borders opened up on am
unprecedented scale.

Even so, the KGB's successors

continued to monitor the movements of Russian citizens and,
in a more recent twist, began to work with organized
criminals to maintain watch on emigre activities.

In

Germany, authorities have evidence that Russian OC groups
have built a base in Berlin and use it as a place to invest
money obtained illegally amd, further, extort money from the
Russian emigre entrepreneurs there.®®
There is also cooperation between Russian OC and the
KGB's successor agencies in the trafficking of Russian
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emigre women.

According to a source in Moscow, prostitutes

are not controlled by OC within Russia.

However, the

"organizatsiya" controls every woman "the moment she goes
abroad."

And many of these women illegally enter the

United States through Mexico, the destination for which they
possessed tourist visas.

Russiem OC provides the "roof" for

those individuals who are involved in this fleshtrafficking.

A director of a Moscow security firm, selling

its service of providing protection, or krysha, (literally,
a "roof") made the point, "We collaborate very closely with
the police and the FSB [successor to the KGB].
don't have problems.

Therefore we

And we do not have any problems with

criminal groups."®®
Within the U.S., the Brighton Beach area in New York
City is one of the major areas where these activities
occur.®®

Russian organized criminals regularly extort the

emigres, who further, are enticed to work with Russian
intelligence.

The situation is creating em increasingly

difficult problem for U.S. law enforcement authorities who
are fighting the new and ugly menace of Russian OC and,
further, must monitor its relationship with the KGB's
successor agencies, particularly the SVR.
Indeed, Russian OC in America has been posing an
increasingly greater threat (to the growing concern of FBI
and U.S. law enforcement agencies, among others) as it
becomes entrenched in major American cities and its power
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emd influence outside Russia's borders continues to spread.
For example, one notorious criminal, "vory-v-zakone"
Vyacheslav Kirillovich Ivankov, vas released early from
Soviet prison (in 1991) only to emigrate to New York City to
run a leading Russian mafia group there.
In 1994, FBI officials believed that Ivankov's mission
was to oversee and enlarge operations involving emigre
activities in the U.S. and gangsters in Russia.^®

U.S.

Customs Agent Joel Campanella indicated that Ivankov was
sent to coordinate gangster activity between Russia and
North America.^®

It was not until 1995 however, that

Ivankov was convicted of masterminding a $3.5 million
extortion scheme in Brooklyn, New York.

To illustrate the

cold-blooded and bold nature of Russian OC, for example,
according to Newsweek, law enforcement officials have
discovered that a former KGB assassin has a contract from
the Russian mafia to teüce out two of the New York-based FBI
agents who helped to ensnare Ivankov."
In 1995, FBI Director Louis J. Freeh had clearly
recognized the threat, identifying Russian OC groups as "a
new transnational enemy, one which is very powerful, very
mobile, and very well supported around the world.""
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CHAPTER 6
SPIES AND NETWORKS
Spying
Spying is "the second oldest profession."

Indeed, as

Polmar and Allen noted, the second and first professions
have a lot in common: they both involve "money, secrecy,
sex, great public interest, and people's reputations - - or
lack thereof."1

Moreover, every sovereign state has an

intelligence service which, as its main function, recruits
people to engage in espionage.

As Cooper and Redlinger

note, there are two kinds of spies: spies in place and
trained spies.^

While spies in place already have access to

information and simply need to be persuaded (accomplished by
various methods) to transfer it, trained spies are em
investment and are taught how to get in and get the
information themselves.

Since, as Polmar and Allen further

note, "Governments seek secret information to eliminate
uncertainty in the conducting of foreign affairs or to gain
an advantage over other countries,

the maintenance of

espionage networks by governments world-wide is considered
to be of the utmost importance.
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The Russians are old hands at the "Great Game."
Russia's political leaders have historically perceived
neighboring states as posing a great threat to their rule.
Thus, geographic territory, resources, culture, people, and
other factors that constitute this "threat" can be
conveniently used to blame foreign governments and
intelligence services for the poor conditions resulting from
the regime's misteücen and failed policies and its endemic
corruption.

So, too, this threat can be given as the reason

why foreign countries must be closely watched in order to
glean information on their affairs.

Therefore, Russian

intelligence services have remained vigilant in the task of
assessing foreign states' capabilities and intentions
through the use of spies.

Former CIA Director Richard Helms

made the point when he remarked that "Spying is part of the
Russian nature.
czars.

They were up to it all the time under the

It will take much more than one little collapse of

the Soviet Union to expunge it from the Russian psyche.
A spy, according to Merriam-webster is, "one who keeps
"secret" watch on a person or thing to obtain information"
(author's italics added),^ "secret" being the key word here.
In the book, Sp v Book; The Encyclopedia of Espionage, a spy
is defined as "A person employed by a government or other
entity to obtain "secret" information or intelligence about
another, usually hostile, entity" (author's italics added).*
Secrecy, again, describes the very essence of spying.
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line with the imperative of secrecy in espionage, in order
to conceal their true identification and purpose, spies
traditionally have adopted a "cover," and a "legend" to
compliment that cover.

Of course, this practice remains the

current trend.
In August 1992, following the post-Soviet Union
restructuring of the Russian security and intelligence
services, a new "Law on Foreign Intelligence" had been
passed.

One section of this law states that "career

personnel may occupy positions in ministries, departments,
establishments, enterprises, and organizations in accordance
with the requirements of this law without compromising their
association with foreign intelligence agencies."’

Further,

it reads, "career personnel of foreign intelligence agencies
may not occupy other salaried positions unless this is a
professional necessity."®
If this law means anything, it codifies the "legal"
right of em intelligence officer to take any position
whatsoever in order to accomplish his goals.

Therefore, one

can assume that when Russian officials claim they do not use
certain covers anymore, i.e. journalistic cover (Primakov
claimed soon after being appointed head of foreign
intelligence in January 1996 that the practice of
intelligence officers using journalistic cover would most
certainly cease),® they can be assumed to be lying.
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Evidence directly contradicting Primakov's statement
has since surfaced.

Indeed, in June 1996, it was reported

that large numbers of SVR officers were stationed at the
Moscow headquarters of Itar-Tass, the Russian news agency,
waiting for their tour abroad to begin.

Further, the report

indicated that the Tass bureau in New York had two SVR
spaces, one of which was already filled.

Furthermore, the

report described these "journalists" primary responsibility
as the collection of political information, mainly
operations intelligence (OSINT), émd the recruitment of
agents.

Additionally, the report noted that the SVR runs

its human assets in the Russian language newspapers that are
published in the United States.’®
In the post-communist world, the SVR continues to
operate under many of the traditional covers used by former
KGB officers.

These covers can be separated into official

and non-official cover.

Within the official cover category,

SVR officers land on American shores as "Foreign Ministry"
employees, diplomats. Trade Ministry representatives, etc..
These operatives work within embassy and consulate walls and
enjoy diplomatic immunity.

If they are "caught in the act

of spying," they are merely ordered to leave the host
country on the basis of their "engaging in activities not
compatible with their official diplomatic duties; they are
declared persona non grata and expelled.
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Those operatives working under non-official covers, (or
"illegal" status), and assuming the popular commercial cover
of "businessmen" and partners, or academicians, students,
journalists, etc., who are discovered spying receive no such
niceties.
death.
covers.

They face torture, long prison terms, and, often,

SVR officers assume all of the eüaove-mentioned
Additionally, there are many "sleeper" agents who

have ensconced themselves deeply within Western society and
have not yet been identified.
The controversy over using journalistic cover arises
from the fact that open and free democracies provide factual
and objective information to their people.

There is a "free

exchange of ideas," including opposing ideas.

The Russian

government, however, practices no such distribution of
information.

Instead, there is heavy censorship.

Indeed,

the dissemination of propaganda by strictly-controlled
procedures continues in "democratic" Russia.

Active

measures and agents of influence continue to be utilized
through the "new and democratic" press, which is
increasingly being bought up and operated by Russian banking
and business elites, many who have been associated with OC,
and who use the media to further their own interests and to
gain political influence.”

Indeed, these entities, in

part, comprise the "new oligarchy" and, as such, closely
collcüDorate with the Russian intelligence services.
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One notable difference in chekist behavior, as
previously discussed, is that former KGB officers now
advertise their intelligence status and affiliation to the
benefit of their personal commercial interests.

However, it

is important to note that this overt demonstration of
espionage career occurs only on the domestic front; Russian
foreign intelligence officers do no such thing.

Naturally,

SVR officers prefer to remain anonymous and free from
surveillance so that they may actively attempt to recruit
and handle agents, and so that they ceui set up and run spy
networks undetected.
Recruiting Methods
The Russian intelligence service has a long history of
using threat and force to recruit its spies.

On the

domestic front, families, careers, and even lives had been
threatened for failure to comply with the demands of the
Soviet secret police.

Indeed, the informer society that was

created, particularly during the Stalin era, was a result of
this sort of intimidation and punishment.

If the KGB

selected a certain Russian national to work at, for example,
the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, and to perform specific tasks,
such as attempting to seduce one of the Marine Guards in
order to gain access to the embassy in order to plant
listening devices, or to work as a janitor, cleaning out
trash cans, and, then reporting all information gleaned and
activity observed to the KGB after work every day, then that
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particular individual did so.
they paid dearly.

Otherwise, they paid, and

As such, fear was the great motivator,

since communism's collapse, however, as human rights
activist Boris Pustitsev notes, "They aren't as omnipotent
as they were, but they still have the ability to create
fear."”
In keeping with its new image as "law-abiding,
"democratic," and recognizing civil rights,” in mid-1992,
SVR public relations spokesman (and former head of the KGB's
Department S (illegals) ) Lt. Gen. Vadim Kirpichenko claimed
that in the recruitment of agents, "uncivilized methods"
were no longer permitted in the SVR.

Instead, spy

recruitment would be achieved by "finding people who
themselves want to help us voluntarily, whether for money or
out of love for Russia.

Furthermore, Kirpichenko

advocated the rejection of the use of drugs and other
coercive means to recruit spies.’*
In so many words, Kirpichenko was trying to convey that
Russian intelligence no longer employs its traditional
tactics; however, his statements could easily be read as
demonstrating his awareness that most individuals that
decide to betray their country volunteer their services on
their own.

Moreover, Kirpichenko's statement on "love for

Russia" may well imply the SVR's use of "sexpionage" tactics
to compromise individuals and/or blackmail them into spying
for Russia.

This technique is an old KGB favorite.
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As David Levis observed in his examination of the KGB's
treatment of sex as an intelligence tool in his book,

Sexpionage;-The Exploitation..of Sex by Soviet.Intelligence,
the KGB places great importance on the perfection of
seducing techniques to be employed by both male agents
("Ravens") and female agents ("Swallows") to accommodate
and, later, exploit the target's sexual preferences,’*
particularly if the target engages in "deviant" sex.
During the cold war, the KGB had recruited people to
spy for Russia on usually either an ideological basis or on
a financial basis.

Occasionally, blackmail was the key

mechanism employed.

Now, ideology is dead and Russia is

very short on cash.

To overcome these barriers to

recruitment, other methods have been implemented.

Former

KGB officer Yuri Shvets has claimed that while in training
at the Intelligence Academy in Russia, he was told by his
masters to use psychology, since "only psychology is
left."”

Indeed, psychology can be a powerful tool when

used correctly.

Nevertheless, the KGB's successors continue

many of their traditional recruiting tactics; however, these
methods have been modified in some cases.
To lower its costs and increase its protection from
foreign counterintelligence. Third World Countries (TWCs)
are increasingly being used as recruiting and meeting sites,
(in addition to other purposes) by Russian intelligence
officers.

This is not to say that the U.S. and Western
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Europe are no longer prime espionage sites.

However, in

TWCs, foreign counterintelligence surveillamce is at a
reduced level.

Instead, each host government's behavior is

a larger factor, as are the host government's relations with
Russia.

Naturally, where the "anti-Russiam"

counterintelligence presence is low, KGB-SVR officers
probably feel safer in meeting in person with their agents.
Indeed, the political climate remains a significant factor
in determining which communication methods will be employed.
For exemple, in communicating with agents in certain "more
secure" environments, SVR officers may employ the brush pass
method.

However, within the U.S., particularly in the

Washington and New York areas where a strong FBI presence
exists, deaddrops are the preferred method of communication
between SVR officers and their agents.
A review of past spy cases reveals a recent switch in
tactics by SVR-KGB recruiters.

The SVR has increasingly

been using TWCs, rather than the U.S., as a preferred
recruiting ground, particularly in recruiting and handling
Americans.

There are two basic reasons for this change in

operational method.
considerably less.

First of all, the cost is less, often
As communism collapsed, the Russian

intelligence services, both domestic and foreign, faced a
cash crunch.

This reality forced the SVR to modify its

procedures while still attempting to remain effective.
Confronted with an intelligence budget reduction, SVR-head
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Primeücov had to find more efficient ways to run the damaged
spy orggmization.
The costs of living and operating in TWCs are simply
less than those incurred by residing in the Western
industrialized countries.

Moreover, the increased

porousness of numerous borders following communism's demise
led memy Americans to travel to the FSU amd the newly-opened
societies of Eastern Europe.

As such, as many Russiams

aptly state, why not just let the Americans come to them?
They have a point, for the Russian intelligence services
could thereby minimize their travel amd operating costs.
Furthermore, the foreign counterintelligence presence in
Russia, and particularly in Moscow, is greatly reduced in
terms of both numbers and effectiveness, while Russian
counterintelligence (FSB) is in great supply.

Indeed, the

difficulties of conducting espionage in Russia are such that
foreign case officers communicate with their agents almost
exclusively through deaddrops, rarely, if ever, meeting with
them in person.”
The second reason that Russian foreign intelligence
officers prefer to operate, specifically to recruit, in TWCs
is the reduced foreign counterintelligence threat there.
Indeed, any counterintelligence presence (of the U.S. or its
close allies) that may benefit the Americans is greatly
wanting in many TWCs today.

Furthermore, many existing

governments of TWCs make it difficult, if not impossible.
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for the U.S. to establish either a counterintelligence
presence or aaiy effective spy network for that matter,
within their borders, which, by contrast, enables the
Russiem intelligence apparatus to more easily establish its
networks there.

For example, the CIA's eüsility to operate

in many Arab countries is seriously lacking, which forces
the Americans to rely on the Mossad for intelligence on Araüo
and Middle Eastern state security organization activities
and terrorists movements, as well as information regarding
the interaction of these groups with the Russian
intelligence services.
Spies
Aldrich Ames
Contrary to claims that the KGB had collapsed right
along with communism, Russiem intelligence operations in the
U.S. continued virtually unad)ated.

It had only been days

after the MB was reneuned the FSK, on February, 21, 1994,
that 53-year old CIA officer Aldrich Ames, who had been
spying for Russia since 1985, was arrested by the FBI for
espionage.”

His arrest was the result of an investigation

that had been formally opened on May 12, 1993 by the FBI's
Washington Field Office.^®
The fact that his Soviet-Russian handlers had continued
to operate virtually uninterrupted even as communism
collapsed and the KGB "was no more" is one exemple
evidencing the fact that KGB networks continued to operate
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within the U.S. as the Soviet Union's landscape transformed
into several new, independent states.

To be sure, the KGB's

successors continue to run "Soviet" agents emd to prioritize
the penetration of foreign intelligence services,
particularly those of, and working within, the
industrialized nations.
In his book. Killer Spy. Peter Naas described Ames'
activities during the nine years that he spied for SovietRussia.

He noted that Ames continued to meüce his annual

meetings with his KGB-SVR hamdlers in Latin America euid
continued to service deaddrops in the Washington area
throughout the era when tumultuous changes were occurring in
Russia as communism collapsed and numerous Soviet
institutions crumbled.

Actually, there was absolutely no

interruption in the KGB-SVR running of Ames except for one
change in handlers ("Andrei" replaced "Vlad") in Caracas at
an October 1992 meeting.

At this meeting, to complement the

new relationship, there had been one variation made in
procedure: Ames was given new signal sites by his new
handler.^’
Even as the KGB was "dismantled," foreign intelligence
was made autonomous from all other Russian security and
intelligence seirvices, and each of the new Russian
intelligence organizations faced major budget constraints,
Ames continued to be paid.

Indeed, Ames was the "highest

paid spy in the history of the world.

He actually
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received $2.7 million from Moscow emd was promised $1.9
million more, for a total of $4.6 million.
During his nine years of spying, Ames gave the Russians
information on U.S. counterintelligence activities, agent
hemdling methods, collection activities, analytic
techniques, communication methods, and other tradecraft.
Furthermore, Ames gave the Russians a wealth of information
on double agent operations and agent validation methods.^*
The KGB-SVR then used this information to double many
agents and, hence, feed disinformation back to the CIA for
transfer to U.S. intelligence consumers, including the
president.^'’ Evidently, with Ames' invalueüale assistance,
from 1987 to 1991, when the CIA discovered the operation due
to poor tradecraft on the Russian side, the KGB successfully
operated a large network of double agents against U.S.
intelligence."*
This network was operated under the direction of KGB
counterintelligence (SCD) and the KGB FCD-SVR.

However,

according to the CIA's damage assessment report, only some
of its informants had been betrayed by Ames and forced to
double (by Russiem intelligence); others had been created by
the KGB simply to confuse the Americans.

In hindsight,

Los Angeles Times reporter Jêmes Risen aptly observed the
situation: "Ames gave the KGB a veritable road map to the
CIA's Soviet espionage networks, allowing them to turn those
networks back against the United States in the late 1980s
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and early 1990s.”

To what extent U.S. perceptions of

Moscow and its foreign and defense policy objectives, among
other things, were manipulated, remains unclear.”
While the Senate and House Intelligence Committees'
damage assessments concluded that Ames compromised more them
100 foreign agents or prospective agents,^® in the CIA's
general deunage assessment, the DCI reported (in December
1995) that Ames' espionage "caused severe wide-ranging and
continuing deunage to U.S. national security interests"
including exposing the identity of numerous U.S.
intelligence assets operating against the Soviet-Russians”
at least ten of which were executed.
Many questions have been raised as to whether Ames
compromised Fred Woodruff, a U.S. official who had been
working out of the U.S. Embassy in Tblisi, Georgia in 1993
when Ames traveled there.

Ames had known Woodruff years

before in Virginia*’ and, hence, could have identified him
as a CIA officer.

Investigators noted that Ames' visit had

been less than one month before Woodruff was killed by an
AK-47 bullet to the head as he was traveling in a jeep with
Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze's personal security
chief. Col. Eldar Gogoladze.”
Amy Knight noted that former Georgian Security Minister
Igor Giorgadze, a protege of SVR-chief Primakov, had offered
Georgian security officers free training in Moscow.**
However, since Woodruff had been helping Gogoladze train
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Georgiem state security forces, one could speculate that
Giorgadze asked Primakov to have the SVR kill Woodruff,
possibly because Woodruff vas training Gogoladze's Georgiem
security service troops emd, hence, posed a competition and,
hence, a threat to Giorgadze*s interests.
However, others have speculated that Woodruff was
killed by the SVR because he had somehow discovered that
Ames was spying for Moscow.”

Could Woodruff possibly have

learned Ames was a spy through Giorgadze or Gogoladze?

In

an added twist to the mystery, a Segodnya newspaper report
indicated that Georgian Security Minister Shota Kviraya had
accused his predecessor, Giorgadze, of arranging the killing
on Moscow's orders.

Furthermore, Kviraya had accused

Gogoladze and another Russian agent posing as a Georgian
businessman of also being in on the plot.**

Naturally, a

spokesman for Russian security services, Yuri Kobaladze,
denied KGB involvement in the killing, stating that the
Russian intelligence service "is not involved in terrorism - it fights against terrorism, together with other
countries, including the United States."**

To close the

(Woodruff) case, Russian authorities arrested a man, who
"admitted to the crime," was convicted, and received a 15year prison sentence for the killing.

Since no evidence

linking Ames with the killing has been found, whether Ames
was involved in Woodruff's death remains a mystery.*’
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Harold Nicholson
Ames' arrest was followed not quite two years later, on
November 16, 1996, by U.S. federal agents' arrest of 46-yr
old, 16-year veteran CIA officer Harold Nicholson.”

One of

the new counterintelligence tools gained by FBI
counterintelligence officials in the wake of the Ames
scandal was the authority to search suspects' financial
records.

Thus, Nicholson's espionage was discovered.

Following the FBI's deeper investigation of Nicholson's
financial records, it was determined most likely that
Nicholson's first payment from the Russians for spying had
been received in the eunount of $12,000 on June 30, 1994.*®
Hence, Nicholson is believed to have spied for the Russians
since at least 1994, or eüaout the time of Ames' arrest.
While Ames was the most-damaging CIA officer ever
charged with spying for Moscow, Nicholson was the highestranking.

Nicholson allegedly began his spying after he was

transferred from his post as Chief of Station (COS) in
Bucharest, Romania, which he had held from 1990-92 and where
his marriage had collapsed, and situated himself in his new
posting as deputy COS in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.^®
Upon the end of Nicholson's tour duty in Romania in
June 1992, he and his wife of 21 years had returned to the
U.S., where she filed for divorce.^’

As such, then, while

he was posted in Malaysia, Nicholson had been preoccupied
with a bitter divorce and custody battle.

Faced with
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mounting expenses and becoming increasingly emotionally
unsteüale, Nicholson was a vulnerable target for recruitment
by foreign intelligence services.
FBI and CIA officials believe Nicholson started his
spying in June 1994 after his fourth meeting with an
official at the Russian embassy in Kuala Lumpur, where he
was deputy COS.
COS.

The meetings had been authorized by the

However, it could be speculated that Nicholson had

been spotted, assessed, and marked for recruitment by the
Russians while stationed in Romania, where he had likely
been kept under close surveillance by Russian intelligence
operatives.

Moreover, the Russians were likely very aware

of Nicholson's personal problems with his wife, which they
could exploit.
As it happened, Nicholson's motive to betray his
country and his agency was money, or rather greed, since he
made a decent salary as it was.

Investigators later found

that Nicholson's spying had begun about the same time as his
alimony payments, equaling 25% of his net salary, were set
to begin.
During its investigation, the FBI had surveilled
Nicholson when he went to Singapore, and where he had
delivered a large batch of secrets to Russian intelligence
officers.

According to the FBI affidavit, Nicholson planned

to meet his Russian handlers again in Switzerland on
November 17, 1996.

Five days prior to this scheduled
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meeting, on November 12, 1996, the concealed cameras in
Nicholson's CIA office showed him kneeling under his desk
photographing documents.

However, FBI agents, disguised as

airport ground crew workers, arrested Nicholson upon his
lemding at Dulles International Airport en route to Zurich,
Switzerland, where he was prepared to board a flight to meet
his Russian hamdlers.
Interestingly, Nicholson had requested (and received)
the camera that he had used to photograph documents from the
CIA supply office.”

Had the Russiems offered to provide

their spy with a camera?

Or were the Russians more "cost

conscious" than they had been during the cold war, when they
had provided expensive Minox cameras to their agents?
Following Nicholson's conviction for espionage on June
5, 1997, he was sentenced to 23.7 years in federal prison.”
In exchange for the short sentence, Nicholson agreed to
cooperate with counterintelligence officials in determining
the damage he had caused.

Contrary to what U.S.

investigators had previously believed, (that Nicholson had
received $180,000 from Moscow), Nicholson actually received
$300,000 from Moscow, which he had hidden away in Swiss bank
accounts.**
Nicholson gave the Russian intelligence service a wideranging assortment of U.S. national security secrets and
exposed both CIA sources and methods in the process.

As an

experienced intelligence officer, Nicholson had been given
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the job of training CIA recruits, which he did from 1994-96.
Following his arrest, the most damaging secrets he provided
the Russiems, which he admitted giving up, were the CIA
recruits' identifications, biographies, and assignments,
which had resulted in the Russians' learning new CIA agent
covers.^*

In other words, he gave the SVR information about

future officers and their work in the CIA's deepest cover
program.^’

As a result, U.S. intelligence on Russian

espionage activities has been severely weeücened.
Nicholson's handlers used different methods of
communication than those used by Ames' handlers, as
discovered by FBI-CIA surveillance teams.

Unlike Ames,

Nicholson only operated overseas and never met with his
Russian handlers within U.S. borders.

And unlike Ames, who

communicated with his handlers mainly through the use of
signal sites amd deaddrops in the Washington D.C. area,
Nicholson never communicated with his handlers through
deaddrops.

Instead, the methodology employed by Nicholson

included (information) drops in foreign railway stations and
he sent postcards with code words to a post office box
overseas from foreign p o s t s . H o w e v e r ,

in both cases, the

FBI acquired pictures of the CIA turncoats face-to-face with
Russian agents; both Ames and Nicholson were also observed
by FBI agents clandestinely meeting in cars with Russian
diplomatic plates.
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Earl Pitts
The FBI's recent arrest of 43-yr-old, 13-year FBI
veteran Earl Edwin Pitts is yet another exemple of the
continuing Russiem intelligence activity in the U.S..

Pitts

was arrested following a 16-month investigation, on December
18, 1996 at the FBI Academy in Quantico, where he was
working at the time of his arrest.

Pitts allegedly began

spying for the Russians between 1987-89 while working on
counterespionage operations in New York City.
According to the FBI affidavit, during that period,
Pitts had access to information on counterintelligence
investigations, including recruitment efforts and double
agent operations involving Russian intelligence officers.*®
Thus, Pitts' work made him a target for recruitment by
Russian intelligence; however, Pitts volunteered his
services.
Pitts first made contact with the KGB in July 1987 by
writing a letter to a Russian, whom he mistakenly believed
to be a KGB agent assigned to the UN's Soviet Mission.

In

the letter, Pitts sought to arrange a meeting with Soviet
intelligence. *’ This Russian, in turn, introduced Pitts to
the New York chief of KGB, Aleksandr Vasilyevich Karpov, at
the New York Public Library.
Thereafter, for a period of five years, from 1987-92,
Pitts made deaddrops of computer disks containing classified
information including family information aUsout fellow FBI
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agents who might be vulnerable to recruitment as Russiam
spies; he identified Russiam agents known to the FBI; gave
details of his own assignment amd exposed the work of an FBI
informant who "reported covertly on Russiam intelligence
matters."

Moreover, he offered to smuggle a Russian agent,

who specialized in bugs, into the FBI Academy in Quantico,
Virginia.
In the FBI's investigation of Pitts, it was discovered
that the most damaging information he had given the KGB was
the FBI's secret list, known as the "Soviet Administrative
List," which is a computerized document that includes
classified information gathered aUbout all Russian officials
posted or assigned to the U.S., and the U.S. agents assigned
to gather that information.*^
In 1992, Pitts ceased his spying; as Los Angeles Times
reporter James Risen noted, Pitts had probaüsly outlived his
usefulness, and in light of diminished Russian intelligence
resources, had been abandoned by the Russians three years
after his August 1989 transfer to FBI Headquarters in
Washington. ** A year later, when a security breach had been
discovered in the FBI's New York office where Pitts had
worked, his name was placed on the circulated list of
potential traitors.

And, then, in an ironic twist, between

1993-95 during the FBI's search for the penetration, Pitts'
initial Russian contact was successfully recruited by FBI
agents.

This Russian defector exposed Pitts' spying.
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Hence, contact with Pitts was made in an FBI sting operation
to "renew the relationship."
The turned Russian agent and an FBI agent posed as
Pitts' new Russian handlers and "restored" the relationship,
leading Pitts to incriminate himself on numerous occasions
as the FBI built its case against him.

Indeed, during the

16-month sting operation, Pitts made 22 drops at Mailboxes
Etc., Box 318, unknowingly informing his undercover
colleagues by beeper each time he intended to make a drop,
he also had nine telephone conversations with his
"handlers," and met them in person twice.
Throughout the duration of the operation, Pitts gave
the FBI his plans on how to smuggle a Russian intelligence
technical expert into the FBI Academy, he provided the
agents with a key to the FBI Academy, provided a special FBI
telecommunications device used to transmit classified
material, and made available his own FBI identification
badge, most likely so the Russians could counterfeit their
own badges.

To top the whole charade off, Pitts kept an

"escape plan" on his CIA office computer.**
Money was the motivation for Pitts' spying, also.
During his five years of spying for Russia, he is believed
to have actually received $124,224.66 from Moscow, plus he
had been promised $100,000 more, (which was being held for
him in Moscow), for a total of $224,224.66.**
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Eastern European Networks and Political Espionage
During the cold war, the security emd intelligence
services of the Eastern European countries were simply
surrogates of the Soviet KGB.

They followed the orders of

Moscow 2uid received their instructions from Moscow.

For

example, KGB "advisors” were present at all (Czech
intelligence service, StB) staff levels and cleared all
intelligence plans and operations.

Indeed, according to

Czech defector Ladislav Bittmam, this procedure took place
on a daily basis.*’
As the new, quasi-democratic governments of these
countries set out to build democratic institutions and
develop legal norms and a judicial system built on the rule
of law, they also sought to reform the security services - a daunting task.

Many of these new security services

retained their former communist party personnel, which made
reform very difficult.*®

Moreover, informant networks

remained somewhat intact because of the existence of secret
police files.

Hence, KGB-SVR officers continued to control

many informants, particularly those who had gained political
or powerful positions in communism's wake.

The fear of

exposure as Soviet spies ensured their continued cooperation
and service.

Even so, communism's collapse still Owreaked havocO on
Moscow's spy network abroad.*®

The loss of ideological

mission that accompanied communism's demise had resulted in
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the KGB-FCD's loss of some of its Soviet agents working
within the Eastern European states.

As SVR first deputy

director Vyacheslav Trubnikov stated in 1995, "We really
have lost that part of our network - the hardest working
part - that cooperated with us on an ideological basis.
These were people who believed in the ideals of socialism,
in the USSR."*®
Increasingly, the old chekists from the cold war period
are leaving the security and intelligence services or
retiring, emd new officers are replacing them.

It will take

time for the KGB's influence and repressive techniques to be
phased out of East European intelligence services as the new
democracies replace the old communist regimes.

The

widespread crime and corruption that has experienced
explosive growth throughout Eastern Europe since communism's
collapse has promoted the survival of Soviet-style secret
police activity.

The major impediment to reform is that the

secret police of these states, like those of the FSU, are
widely corrupt and in colleUsoration with OC, which
exacerbates the political-economic-social insteüsility of
many of these countries.
The Russian foreign intelligence service has been
working to rebuild its fragmented espionage networks within
Eastern Europe and regain the tremendous influence it had
enjoyed, achieved through its predecessors' unsparing and
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brutal application of force, and, thus, control over the
Soviet Union's satellite states.
However, the situation in these states dreunatically
changed upon communism's demise.

Travel restrictions were

lifted and these peoples gained much greater access to
information.

Also, in many of these Eastern European

states, Internet access has become ubiquitous.

Within the

intelligence sector,, each state restructured its
intelligence service, and to some extent, in light of the
newly-gained freedoms and the overwhelming public opinion
demands that these newly-gained rights be recognized and
supported by the authorities, state security cibuse has been
reduced.
Nevertheless, the secret police presence, surviving off
of its well-developed informant network from the Soviet era,
still exists.

Ineviteüsly, many KGB informants that remain

cooperative following these states' gaining of independence
from Moscow do so because they can not break with their
past.

Indeed, the KGB-SVR maintains detailed files on each

informant and, the fear of exposure and the retribution that
would likely follow in the form of loss of career, or worse,
in addition to the pressure the SVR surely continues to
apply on these informants to continue to spy, has enadaled
the SVR to retain some influence over events there.
Indeed, as Louise Shelley notes in her recent book.
Policing Soviet Society: The evolution of state control, the
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former KGB's effect on the present amd future state of
police and state security organizations in Eastern Europe
will take many years to eradicate even as these states
struggle to democratize.

Shelley stated that, "by

perpetuating the power of the state at the expense of the
rights of individual citizens, the traditions of Soviet
policing will impede democratization in many of these
[Eastern European] nations for years to come.
Since the newly-independent Baltics refused to join the
CIS, they are treated by the SVR as any other foreign state.
In short, these countries are well-seeded with SVR agents.
Moreover, the SVR has the benefit of its KGB predecessors'
work in these states: the informant network and the
intelligence services' files (to force cooperation) are
well-developed and remain in place.^

So, too, it is most

likely, many sleeper agents and illegals remain in place.
Unlike the CIS member republics, since gaining
independence in 1991, all three Baltic state governments
have passed laws that enable prosecutors to arrest former
KGB agents suspected of persecuting the Baltic peoples
during the Soviet era.

And many officials that collaborated

with Moscow have indeed been sentenced under the laws to
years in prison.“
In the post-cold war world, many former Soviet spies
residing and operating in Eastern Europe have gone into
private business, while they doubtless maintain their
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intelligence contacts.

Others, rarely being paid or no

longer on the payroll of the Russian government, have likely
sold their services to OC groups amd foreign intelligence
services.

Nevertheless, many remain entrenched in the same

intelligence organizations of which they have worked for
years.
As Amy Knight noted, the collapse of the KGB's Eastern
European espionage networks greatly impeded its ability to
glean information on NATO member activities.^

Not only did

the KGB-SVR maintain contact with its informants throughout
the collapse of communism, but, more importantly, it
"established an underground network throughout Eastern
Europe"®^ under Primakov's direction.
There is no doubt that a widespread and well-built
sleeper network exists throughout Eastern Europe.

Surely,

as these newly-independent countries become NATO members in
NATO's expansion eastward, the Russian intelligence services
will be working toward better developing their espionage
networks there.

As Western influence and power, projected

through NATO, have extended eastward, the SVR has been
attempting to infiltrate the political institutions of these
(former Soviet satellite) states in order to thwart
U.S./NATO foreign and defense policy goals.
The Russians' concern over NATO expansion has been
expressed at many levels.

From the intelligence sector, a

spokeswoman reported in September 1995 that the SVR would be
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monitoring NATO expansion closely.®®

That seune month, the

Czech Republic's Federal Security and Information Service
(FBIS), in its 1995 annual repoxrt, claimed that Russian
intelligence had initiated a campaign to hinder the Czech
Republic's entrance into NATO.

Furthermore, the FBIS

reports showed estimates of around 400 Russian agents
operating within the country, 56 of which were accredited
diplomats.®^
The spy scandal that erupted as Poland prepared to hold
its November 1995 presidential elections brought the
memories of the interference in Polish affairs and the
atrocities committed against the Poles by Soviet
intelligence back to the forefront of the Polish peoples'
minds.

Poland has had to overcome many barriers in its

attempts to end its repressive system, rid itself of Soviet
influence, and break with its past.

Part of Poland's effort

at democratization was the recent holding of free elections.
During these elections, the Soviet-Russian intelligence
services involvement in Poland's political affairs became
evident.

The accusation that newly-elected (November 1996)

former communist president Aleksander Kwasniewski's newlyappointed Prime Minister Jozef Oleksy was a Soviet spy and
had spied for Moscow from the early 1980s until 1995®® was
made by former Solidarity leader and Polish President Lech
Walesa's Interior Minister Andrzej Mikzanowsk.®®

These

accusations ultimately led to Oleksy's resignation in late
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Jamuary 1996. ° Oleksy emphatically declared himself
innocent of the charges, claiming that his 13-year
"neighborly relationships" with Soviet-Russian intelligence
agents were simply harmless friendships.^^
In the mix-up that followed the spying allegations,
Oleksy fired Dep. Interior Minister Henryk Jasik, who had
supervised the inquiry into Oleksy's alleged espionage,
replacing him with former dissident surveiller and communist
partner, Jerzy Konieczny.

Poland's counterintelligence

chief then quit in p r o t e s t . C l e a r l y , the activities of
the KGB-SVR in trying to thwart Poland's attempts at reform
and democracy pose a continuing threat to Polish
independence from negative Russian influence.
As the East European states struggle to build
democratic institutions and break their former relationship
with the Soviet secret police, SVR interference will pose a
continuing threat to political stability in each country.
Even so, the membership of the Czech Republic, Poland, and
Hungary into NATO moved closer to reality with the May 27,
1997 signing of the "Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Co
operation and Security" in Paris by Yeltsin and NATO's 16
heads of government,

(to be followed up with a Madrid summit

meeting on July 8, 1997 with the same leaders to start talks
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on [alliance] enlargement^^ and, additionally, to announce
the new NATO members)
In Romania, recently elected (November 1996)^^
President Emil Constantinuescu has begun a forceful campaign
to eradicate corruption euid collaUaoration between political
leaders, organized criminals, and the secret police.

An

effective corruption commission was created emd has been
seeking to completely crush Romania's "public-private
mafias."

Indeed, many corrupt bankers, politicians, and

powerful criminals have been jailed.

Moreover, since

Constantinescu took office in January 1997, with as one of
his aims the creation of a truly independent judiciary, the
national police force has removed one-fourth of its county
chiefs.

Police chief Pavel Abrahem stated that, "We're

finished with mystery and secrecy. " ® And in May 1997, the
long-serving chief of Romemia's intelligence service was
forced out.

It appears Constantinescu's drive for a

democratic Romania may ultimately be successful since
efforts at confidence-building measures, such as the
development of institutions that the cynical mass public can
trust, are progressing.

The Founding Act sets up a permanent NATO-Russia joint
council that will meet monthly and operate on the
"consensus" principle, however, Russia has no veto power.
Further, this council will outline Russian-NATO agreement
cooperation on security matters vis-a-vis the former Warsaw
Pact states, particularly involving weapons and troop levels
on new states.
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The current situation in Bulgaria is conducive to the
development of OC, terrorist, smd secret police
relationships, in antagonism to law and freedom.

Bulgaria

has long been a center of "Soviet-inspired" espionage emd
has served as the base for one of Eastern Europe 's "most
sinister" secret police organizations.

Throughout the cold

war, Bulgarian agents were implicated in numerous plots,
many in cooperation with the Soviet K6B.^^

And since

communism's demise, the country has been plagued by highlevel corruption and a multitude of extortion rackets, which
are widely believed to have political connections.
In October 1996 Bulgaria's first post-communist Prime
Minister, Andrei Lukanov, served for one year before he was
shot dead in front of his apartment building by a "hobo"
armed with a Russian-made automatic pistol.

Many government

members and other diplomats suspect that Russian 00 was
responsible for the killing, since Lukanov was heavily
involved in JVs with Russian groups.

Or, it is suspected

that Lukanov's death was political murder, since Lukanov had
recently had a falling out with his Russian partners on an
oil deal that had many political implications. ® Either
scenario points to Russian intelligence involvement.
Serbia has become a bastion for organized criminals.
Iranian and Colombian drug smugglers now use it as a
preferred smuggling route to Europe.

One individual

handling government-private contracts commented that.
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"bribes are flowing in here like water" as OC groups
position themselves to teüce government contracts and to buy
up state-owned business.
Moreover, prostitution, fueled by the demand that the
53,000 NATO-led peace-keeping force presents, is reunpant.
Organized criminals often control the sex rings, chemneling
the proceeds to support their arms-trafficking ventures,
which are themselves highly profitcü>le in light of the
numerous ethnic conflicts raging throughout the region.

The

situation is exacerbated by the fact that, in meuiy cases,
the police are closely intertwined with the criminal
networks. ® As such, OC activity in the region thrives.
Serbia has also become a bastion for spies.

In

February 1997, Time reported that Serbian spymaster Jovica
Stanisic controls an 80,000-strong police force and an
"extensive network of spies".®®

Another report compared

1996 Sarajevo to the spy capitals of Vienna and Berlin
during the cold war.

The former Yugoslavia's internal

strife is a scenario where multifarious external forces
contribute to the turmoil, and some exploit it for personal
gain or their own interests.

Russian backing of the Serbs,

along with Arab and Iranian support of the Muslims®^ has
added fuel to the volatile situation in that country.®^
This situation has increased the potential for spillover
into surrounding areas as the implicit issues there threaten
to become more internationally significant.
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The seriousness of the East European crime situation
has led to some cooperation between Western and Russiem law
enforcement officials.

For example, in May 1996, for the

third consecutive year, police officials from five Western
nations and Russia met in London to discuss the OC problem
of Eastern European gangster activities.®^

However,

Primakov's 1993 visits to many of these same Eastern
European countries to reestablish relations between
intelligence and security services emd to formalize
coordination agreements on the basis of OC, drug and arms
trafficking ®^demonstrates a continued close relationship
between the Russian and East European intelligence services.
Even so, Russian-East European tensions may likely develop
and, further, increase when these former Warsaw Pact
countries join NATO against Kremlin wishes.

Surely,

attempts to flush Soviet-Russ ian spies out of the new NATO
members' security and intelligence services will coincide
with these states' integration into any NATO arrangements
with the West.
By contrast, the post-communist intelligence situation
in East Germany was different than that of the remaining
former Soviet and Soviet-bloc states.

The release of the

East German secret police (Stasi) files after the Berlin
Wall fell resulted in the subsequent arrest and trial of
numerous East German intelligence officials, including
spymaster Marcus Wolf, who had headed the East German
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espionage apparatus (Stasi) from 1953-86.®^

Also known as

"the man without the face," he had been charged repeatedly®®
and spent a large part of his recent life fighting the
Germem judicial process.
During the cold war, the Stasi had been one of the
world's largest espionage services, with 85,000 agents, in
the world.

Drawing on KGB traditions, its agents had

pervaded every aspect of East Germany, smd much of West
German society.

Indeed, in retrospect, one FBI official

stated that, "The East Germans had the most extensive
intelligence and spy network in the West and probably had
West Germany penetrated more than any place on Earth."®^
Whatever happened to the 85,000 agents?

Unlike the

intelligence officers of the East European states, who faced
"new" countries with new ideas, the East German intelligence
service and East Germany became defunct in 1990.

Hence,

many of these Stasi agents either went underground or fled
the country out of fear of prosecution.

It is likely that

many of them have sold their services to foreign
intelligence services and international OC groups.

Others

remain as sleeper agents in the reunified Germany.
It is plausible to assume that since the KGB had
exerted such great influence on the Stasi, and had worked so
closely with the secret police agency, many of its (former)
spies that remain within the German subterrain have
maintained their links with the (former) KGB as a source of
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intelligence on the events taking place within reunified
Germemy.

Moreover, the collaboration in 1994 between the

BND and SVR in plutonium smuggling is indicative of a new
cmd friendly relationship between German and Russiam
intelligence in the post-communist world.
The "Near Abroad" and Terrorism
When the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was
created in December 1991, comprised of 12 of the 15 former
Soviet republics (the Baltics refused to join), each
republic gained its own independence.

It is important to

recognize that even though these republics became autonomous
or sovereign states, they remained very dependent on Russia.
This dependence was in the form of both economic and
military (national security) needs.
The political-social environment in many of the
republics is one where pluralities of nationalists and,
hence, ethnic conflicts and civil wars rage as each nation
seeks its own political dominance over the other competing
ethnicities.

During the Stalin era, the borders of these

republics had been artificially drawn so as to foment this
sort of volatile situation; Stalin's divide-and-rule
policy,*® plus the total repression of these peoples by his
NKVD, kept the ethnic hostilities under Center control and
subject to strategic provocation by the secret police,
which, in turn, fueled the fires of ethnic hatred in the
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dictator's efforts to distract the people from opposing his
totalitariem rule.
When in 1991 the former Soviet republics became
sovereign states, each of their governments could, in
theory, create and control their own institutions, free from
Kremlin control and interference.

However, within the

security and intelligence sector, many of the old Soviet KGB
institutions were simply rensuned.
As previously noted, each republic had created its own
KGB.

However, this often eunounted to a simple facelift of

the old organization.

As Amy Knight pointed out, even

though some former KGB officers, (specifically, those of
Russian nationality) returned to Moscow, many of the native
KGB staffers retained their positions in the newly-former
republic intelligence apparatuses.

Furthermore, these

same native KGB staffers maintained their chekist ties with
Moscow, which, moreover, continued to exert its influence in
the republics through these chekists.
Since the Russian MSB (KGB successor agency created in
the wake of the CIS' formation) had claimed the material and
financial resources of the former Soviet republic KGB
units*® immediately following the dissolution of the USSR,
the new agencies that replaced them were (left) weak and
disorganized.

As Amy Knight notes, those personnel that had

remained with the newly-created republic KGBs were
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experienced in counterintelligence and domestic security,
but lacked any foreign intelligence capabilities.
The Kremlin's strategic reasoning here was its
intention on thereby placing the republic's security forces
in a weakened state, and, hence, creating as much dependency
as possible on their maintenance of old links with the
Center to help ensure Moscow's control over the political
stability or instability throughout the region.

Thereby,

Moscow could retain some control over events there,
maintained through the utilization of Russian military
troops, thousands of which remain based within (most of) the
republics.

Moreover, the Kremlin's arming and supporting of

those forces that are pro-Moscow and pro-reintegration
minded continues while, so, too, does intimidation of any
opposition.
Former KGB FCD personnel either pulled out or they
stayed and continued to work in the newly-created republic
KGBs, but for the TsSR-SVR, rather than for the new
republics' interests specifically.

Moreover, SVR and top

military officers, since they controlled Russia's weapons
sector, supplied any groups to their choosing with
(conventional) weapons of their choosing.

As such, while

keeping the republics in a state of civil war or turmoil,
these officers additionally made large sums of cash on
weapons deals.

In her 1996 book. Spies Without Cloaks. Amy

Knight accounts Russian media stories of just these sorts of
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trades.*^

Naturally, such deals involved corrupt officials

and orgemized criminals, and as a Russian journalist noted,
provided great incentives - - personal profits, which a
portion of are used to thwart any official investigations*®
that may arise through the payment of bribes and, further,
are used to keep feeding the fires of conflict.
Since many of the CIS states possessed valueüale natural
resources, plus strategic worth (they shared borders with
the Russiam Federation), one could not expect Russian
foreign intelligence to just leave their control to the
indigenous peoples.

Like the old Soviet KGB's informant

networks in post-communist East Europe, its networks
remained intact in the Russian republics also.

This fact

can be partially attributed to the KGB's maintenance of its
voluminous files.*'*

As Amy Knight noted, this perpetuating

situation makes it likely that the SVR is currently the main
intelligence-gatherer in the CIS states,*^ especially since
the remnants of the former Soviet republic KGBs do not have
the skills or capability for this task.

Rather, Russian

integration with these states is a Moscow foreign policy
priority, as Yeltsin indicated in 1994, and Kremlin
officials have repeatedly stated since then.

Further, Amy

Knight notes that Yeltsin tasked the SVR "to acquire
'preemptive information' on the plans and intentions of the
West toward the other CIS states and also tasked the service
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to 'systematically monitor' the situation along Russia's
borders. "*®
According to Amy Knight, the SVR's role in the "near
abroad" has been to provide Yeltsin's government with
intelligence on the political situation there.

Surely,

since many of the republics contain a wealth of natural
resources, the SVR also gathers economic intelligence.
Indeed, Russia zealously seeks to maintain its hold on
future access to republic resources even while the
development of their resources and, in turn, economies could
benefit greatly by the use of U.S. technology, which is a
necessity for their realization of the massive wealth they
contain and which Moscow cannot currently provide.

For

example, instead of republic interests sharing the resources
with Western oil firms in exchemge for technical and
drilling expertise, rather, the "new oligarchy" employs the
SVR to work to help Russian businessmen to steal it.
(Russian officials constantly attempt to maintain or to take
control over republic resources, which they tend to believe
are theirs).
As Karen Dawisha observed, Yeltsin's foreign policy
emphasizes that "the sphere of Russia's economic, political,
and humanitarian interests extends to the entire post-Soviet
space"*® and, moreover, hovers in its neo-imperialist stance
over these states, in an attempt to stake its claim as the
"protector of their national security interests."
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Certainly, there is a great amount of SVR-FSB
collaboration in the "near abroad."

The SVR extends its

influence through its relationships with the FSB, which
maintains a close relationship with the new republics'
security and intelligence organizations.

As Amy Knight

noted, between 1992-94, intelligence cooperation agreements
were signed between Russia and all of the CIS states.**
These agreements serve as the overt and official basis for
chekist (domestic and foreign intelligence) collaboration.
Indeed, Russian political leaders' recent and ongoing
displays of paremoia of Americem influence on Russia's or
the former Soviet republics' policies is reminiscent of
Stalin's psychopathic concern about U.S. influence and the
spread of capitalist democracy into the Soviet Union.
As memy Americam scholars suggest, Russia's current
foreign policy in the "near abroad" is the reassertion of
imperial control, which would only serve to undermine the
democratic process that has begun there.

Obviously, Moscow

aims to accomplish this objective through "reintegration",
whether voluntary or by force,

(when possible), as the

Russian military's recent bombardment of Chechnya
demonstrated.

Indeed, it has been suggested that one of the

Kremlin's main purposes in attacking Chechnya was to prepare
the building of a pipeline through the city of Grozny.
Moreover, the SVR, in collaboration with the FSK, is
currently fomenting conflicts in other former Soviet
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republics in an effort to maintain their political
instability and, hence, their dependency on Russia for
security, in stark contrast to Moscow's claim that it seeks
an end to the ethnic hostilities and, rather, political
steibility throughout the region, as implied in its new
military doctrine.®®®
The case of Azerbaijan provides a clear exemple of
Kremlin thinking toward the "near eüsroad," particularly in
regard to those republics that possess significant amounts
of natural resources.

Not surprisingly, Azerbaijani

President Gaidar Aliyev has been the target of four coup
attempts, each believed to have been supported by Moscow. ®®
In another exemple of Russian intervention in
Azerbaijan, Moscow has exploited the ethnic conflict between
Azerbaijan and the republic's Armenian enclave, NagornoKarabakh, in an effort to induce Aliyev to cooperate in
favor of Russian "new oligarchy" oil interests, rather than
with established Western oil firms,®®® which have an interest
in forming JVs and consortiums with the Aliyev government to
develop Azerbaijan's oil.

As Jim MacDougall points out, it

is in Moscow's interest to continue the Nagomo-Karbakh
conflict since it improves and secures its potential control
over the flow of future Caspian oil (by forcing any oil
pipeline north, through Chechyna).
The contemporary Central Eurasian political landscape
is one where the oil-rich Caspian Sea region encompasses the
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strategic space between Russia amd Iran.

Surely, both SVR

and Iranian intelligence officers are vigilantly monitoring
and attempting to influence events in this highly-volatile,
but resource-rich territory.

Energy resources in the

Caspian Sea region alone have been estimated to contain up
to 200 billion barrels of oil and natural gas.®°^
Particularly since Azerbaijan gained independence from
Moscow, Aliyev has welcomed Western investment.

Hence, to

thwart warmer relations between the Azerbaijan government
and Western oil firms, Russia has illegally provided more
than $1 billion in arms to neighboring rival Armenia,
allowing it to occupy 20 percent of Azerbaijan in its
efforts to undermine U.S.-Azerbaijani economic goals.
Furthermore, Russia has provided Iran with nuclear-related
technologies, missile components, and other advanced
equipment, presumedaly for exchange of cooperation in
thwarting U.S. oil investment there.

A joint statement was

issued by Russia and Iran in June 1996 stating that, "Iran
and Russia should cooperate with regional states to prevent
the presence of [United States] power in the Caspian Sea."®°®
The warmer relations between Russia and Iran are not
only political and economic.

The Russian intelligence

services have also developed a paramilitary link with
Iran.®°®

The SVR is back in the business of training

terrorists as evidenced by the fact that in early 1995, SVRchief Primakov met in February, and again in July, with
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Iremian intelligence chief Ali Fallahian.

These meetings

culminated in the signing of an accord on cooperation, in
addition to the closing of orders for eavesdropping and
transmission equipment, the stationing of Russian experts in
Iran, and the SVR's creation of a regional hub in Teheran
that covers Azerbaijan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Oman, and the
UAE.

Reportedly, the Iranian government wemted Primakov to

aid in improving Iranian security and intelligence
services,®®® a task Russian intelligence was only too eager
to fulfill.

According to Egyptian intelligence, a

delegation of around 250 Iremian security officials returned
from a 7-month long SVR training visit to Moscow on
September 10, 1995.®®®
In observing the recent Primakov-Fallahian exchanges, a
senior Pentagon official aptly noted that "Directors of
intelligence don't meet with each other without agreements
on exchanging information."

Further, he stated that,

"Primakov has an interest in more than just selling nuclear
reactors and guns to Iran.

His ties are also part of a new

strategic relationship that gives Russia an entry to
[Persian] Gulf politics."®®* Furthermore, as Weinberger and
Schweizer insightfully noted, "If Russia and Iran succeed in
their designs on the Caspian, they will have potential
leverage over Western economies, which will be left to rely
on the unsteüole Persian Gulf region for oil."®®®
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And, in fact, Russia continues to work toward warmer
relations with those Middle Eastern countries that have
historically been antagonistic to democratic and Western
ideals, mainly by providing favorable arms deals.

The

Russieui relationship with these states is not limited to
arms deals, however; Moscow also seeks to gain influence emd
expand its markets in the Middle East through the oil and
gas business.

Toward this end, and in flagrant disregard

for the international sanctions against Iraq, in March 1997,
Russia signed a $10 billion oil deal with the Iraqi
government.®®®

Nevertheless, the main thrust of Moscow's

aims in the Middle East remain within the weapons sector.
Throughout the cold war, Soviet policy in the Middle
East had been to support rogue states such as Libya, Iraq,
and Iran.

Primeücov's prior service and agenda as KGB FCD

head, later SVR chief, and currently Russian Foreign
Minister has proven predisposed to arming and supplying
terrorists in those seme regions.

In 1990, Deputy Foreign

Minister Victor Posuvaluk stated that, consistent with
recent Soviet history, Russia intended "to pursue an
increasingly active policy" in the Middle East.

He asserted

that "Russia will keep up contacts with those who are
regarded as outcasts."

Moreover, he claimed that "it would

be a misteüce to withdraw from the Middle Eastern arms
market. "®®®
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When Yeltsin appointed Primakov to the post of Foreign
Minister (FM) in January 1996, and appointed SVR first
deputy Col. Gen. Vyacheslav Trubnikov, also an
"Orientalist," as SVR-chief (Aleksei Scherbedcov became
Trubnikov 's replacement),®®® a continuation of Primakov 's
(with Yeltsin's support) initiatives in the Middle East was
assured.®®^
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION
The problem the international community faces is that
it has become very difficult to distinguish SVR officers emd
organized criminals from Russian businessmen.

Since the

"new oligarchy" controls Russian business, intelligence is
gathered for both the state emd private business.

Hence,

the Russian intelligence services are collecting information
that fits the agenda of those very same people who are
responsible for the massive theft of Russia's resources and
the billions of dollars worth of capital flight.
A question that must be asked is how long can the
Russian state withstand the unproductive exploitation of
resources that contributes nothing to the economy itself?
Currently, members of the "new oligarchy" control a majority
of Russia's commercial enterprises and virtually all the
major industries.

Because the top industrialists use their

political connections to gain tax and export exemptions^ and
therefore do not pay taxes, coupled with the government's
failure or ineüaility to gain revenues because of a tax
collection system within which corrupt personnel accept
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bribes to subsidize their minuscule incomes rather than
attempt to collect taxes, the Russian tax base has become
exceedingly narrow.

Consequently, millions of Russian

soldiers and pensioners have not been paid for months.

This

situation could lead to great unrest and instability, and,
hence, poses a threat to states outside Russia's borders.
In 1995, Yegor Gaidar argued that the greatest danger
to Russia's economy was the integration of private business
and government.^

And, as Moscow News' columnist Vladimir

Gurevich explains, this is the situation describing the
relationships that have become the trend in Russia today.^
By 1996, criminal groups and commercial enterprises had
become completely integrated.

Victor Loshak, Moscow News'

editor-in-chief, made this point in May 1996 when he stated
that, "Today the success of Russian business is said to have
a lot to do with its proximity to the Kremlin.

Further

clarification is provided by the statement of Boris
Berezovsky that, "it would be absolutely hypocritical to
maintain that business is developing strictly according to
laws declared by the state ... everyone who is successful in
business today, without exception, has some sort of
relationship with concrete individuals at the top.
Again, how long can the Russian economy and state
withstand this trend?

Because OC controls many Russian

banks, the country is becoming a preferred location for
money-launderers, who can easily move bulk money across the
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Russian border by simply paying bribes to Border Troops and
then concealing the cash within packaged goods emd vehicles,
employing the same methods used to smuggle people, stolen
cars, drugs, and other illegal goods across state borders.
Even terrorists such as the ones who bombed a Moscow city
bus in October 1995 succeeded in bribing their way across
the border.^

Others have labeled the paying of bribes to

border guards and customs officials "routine."’

In fact,

the corruption is so deep-rooted that many security
officials conspire to make it difficult for the consumer to
get a visa, make a telephone call, or get a car (which may
be loaded with all sorts of contreüsand) , across the border
without first paying a hefty bribe.®
At a July 1996 conference on "The Shadow Economy: Its
Economic, Social and Legal Aspects" held in Moscow, deputy
chief of the FSB's Economic Counterintelligence Department,
Vladimir Sergeyev, pointed out that whole regions of Russia
are totally controlled by OC and that close to 70% of
'dirty' money equal to about 50 trillion rubles a year is
currently being laundered through illegal commercial
structures.®
The problem of money laundering exists not only in
Russia but also throughout the Russian republics where an
even greater deterioration of life and economy are
accompanied, and further, compounded by the workings of
notoriously corrupt law enforcement agencies.
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government funds contributes directly to this situation.
For example, Kazakhstani KGB Chairman Jenisbek Jumanbekov
stated in early 1996 that the country faced a serious
problem of forged bank documents, illegal exporting, and
money-laundering.

He asserted that literally billions of

dollars worth of false bank guarantees had been confiscated
in 1995 alone.
of the FSU.

The problem is not confined to individuals

Gangsters around the world exploit the Russian

banking situation.

For exemple, Jumanbekov also had

discovered that members of the new Nigerian government had
aimed to transfer $30-40 million dollars into Kazeüchstani
bank accounts.’®
In 1994, Russian specialist Louise Shelley observed
that, "domination by the Communist Party may be replaced by
the controls of OC."”

And, indeed, that is exactly what

has happened: a banking oligarchy consisting of OC elements
has become a dominant power structure in post-Soviet Russia.
The threat OC poses to the international business community
is real, and it is growing.

Many Russian banks have been

working to become reliable and stable enough to enter U.S.
financial markets, a move which would enable foreign
companies to trade on the Russian stock market.”

Already,

the American Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has
enforced action against a Russian investment fund that was
charged with making an illegal public offering of securities
by advertisements published in the New York Times.”
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The spread of Russ lam OC has no boundaries.

And where

there is Russian OC, there are Russian intelligence
operatives.

Any state's economy may be targeted, as

evidenced by the fact that by the mid-1990s, reports had
surfaced of Russian dummy bank operations in foreign
countries.

In 1996, for example, Spanish intelligence

(CESID) officials alleged that the Russian mafia, through
Russian dummy banks, was laundering money in the Spanish
tourist industry and also real estate.

Further, they

alleged that the Russians were "rushing" to teüce over
Spanish private banks in order to launder mafia money
through them and, ultimately, to gain control of Spain's
finances.”
In another exemple, a report indicated that Russians
were "buying up companies" and purchasing controlling
interests in many local firms and industries in Cyprus.

In

addition, the report stated that Russian intelligence was
building up an infrastructure there as a control base for
its Middle East operations.’^
Corruption at the highest levels of the Russian
government has exacerbated the economic problems that the
Kremlin faces, particularly in light of its lack of
revenues.

Moreover, the continued flight of state capital

by corrupt officials has plagued the reform process.

For

exemple, the 1995 boom in Russian-Spanish business in the
tourism and real estate sectors can in part be attributed to
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Russia's lack of laws on the acquisition of foreign real
estate.

Indeed, the nonexistence of any esteüslished tax

rate in this sphere could even be perceived as a
"legalization of capital flight."

The process involved was

one in which real estate acquisitions were accomplished in
the name of foreign companies with overseas accounts that
were opened without Russia's Central Bank's permission;
thus, the result was that when Russians (typically members
of the "new oligarchy") purchased foreign real estate,
usually with laundered money, there was no contribution to
the state budget and the Russian government had no recourse
to recover either the stolen money or taxes on its use.’®
The Kremlin justifies the activities of the KGB's
successors on the grounds of "national security."

A more

accurate description would be "personal and political
security"; as part of the "new oligarchy's" search for
profits and private gain, the Russiem security and
intelligence services use their JVs with foreign partners
and firms throughout the world as the cover for their
espionage and recruitment activities.

This is the essential

role of the chekists in the contemporary world - - to enrich
themselves emd their comrades through espionage and the
control of Russian business.
Moreover, OC plays a major role here, as Professor
Yakov Kostyakovsky, a researcher at the St. Petersburg
branch of the Sociology Institute has pointed out; that is.
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entrepreneurship in Russia today originated as OC activity;
specifically, when "thieves-in-law" were invited to manage
banks.”

The trend is continuing.

Because of the lack of

clear tax legislation, the Federal Tax Police's corruption,
emd the government's levying of exorbitant taxes on emy
honest firms that may exist, the state's economy and the
Russiem standard of living suffer tremendously.

And those

tax police who do try to do their job, face tremendous
obstacles.

In a vivid example of the problems associated

with tenc collecting, in 1996, 26 Russian tax collectors were
killed and 74 were injured in the course of their work, six
were kidnapped, and 41 had their homes burned down.”
To illustrate the extreme range of corruption, a Tax
Police report noted that massive amounts of taxpayer funds
had been passed through banks known to be insolvent.

The

report suggested that to prevent this from occurring and to
persuade companies to make tax payments through bona fide
banks would require tax obligations to only be considered
fulfilled when the tax payment was entered into the budget
account at the proper tax inspectorate.’® The problem was
that it was the officials of government-owned businesses,
not the officials of honest businesses (many of these have
simply been taxed out of existence), who were cheating the
government.
As Russia's financial situation continued to spiral out
of control, the West continued to send assistance.
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the foreign intelligence sphere, Moscow aimed to avoid the
foreign policy implications that would accompany the making
of illegal arms transfers, which tended to draw the chagrin
of America, "The Great Financier," and, consecpiently,
constituted risking a loss in U.S. government-backed loans
or International Monetary Fund and World Bank monies.

These

monies were meant to be used as leverage to coerce the
Russian government to keep the scale of corruption within
certain limits.

However, as J. Michael Waller pointed out

in a 1996 article concerning American aid to Moscow,
paradoxically, U.S. dollars have only discouraged reforms
and Eibetted OC and official corruption.^®
Any domestic opposition to Kremlin policy continues to
be perceived, posited, and condemned by the Russian security
and intelligence services, and the masters they serve, as
subversive conspiracies engineered and designed by the
West.^’

Indeed, the Russian propaganda machine continues to

be very powerful emd influential and remains in force,
contrary to Moscow's claim of its demise.

The KGB's

successors' efforts to affect and alter world opinion to
perceive the Russian intelligence services as "reformed,"
with legal controls, continue on a grand scale.

The

chekists' role in the Kremlin's public relations, as J.
Michael Waller closely examined in his 1994 book on the
KGB,” remains prominent.

So long as Moscow continues to

accuse the West as being the source of Russia's problems.
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labeling any Western assistemce as "subversive," and fails
to stifle corruption, make and enforce laws, emd improve its
situation from within, the country will only worsen its
present state of affairs, particularly within the economic
realm.
In a June 1996 report to the Moscow State Institution
of International Relations outlining Russian foreign policy,
Primakov stressed the need for an active foreign policy.

He

must have had the SVR in mind when he stated that external
factors must be actively created for dealing with the
domestic situation, particularly the economy.^®

Cries for

aid to help the "poor Russian people” are laughéüale when it
is only the ruthless new oligarchy that reaps the benefits
of foreign economic aid.

Indeed, his statement is a call

for technological, industrial, and economic espionage
assistance and intelligence.

Thus, Primakov inferred that

the SVR, (which Primakov strongly influences since the
Russian foreign intelligence service is currently headed by
his former SVR first deputy, Trubnikov), was conducting its
economic espionage offensive as an attempt to heal the
Russian economy.

That idea is ludicrous.

In reality, the

information gained through Russian espionage, again, has
only aided "new oligarchy" businesses, and certainly has not
been used to any benefit to the Russian populace, and
particularly the peoples of the former Soviet republics,
whose societies and resources Moscow continues to exert
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great influence over.

Moreover, the point was somehow

missed that enforcing codified and unambiguous laws,
applicable to all, would be the first step in healing the
Russian economy.
In order to strengthen Russia's international position,
Primakov stressed the need to coordinate its foreign policy
making bodies because, he stated, the situation where each
ministry has its own foreign policy must end.

Further, he

called for Russiem ambassadors in foreign lands to take
responsibility to coordinate the activities of all active
Russian agencies within their respective countries.
Hence, Primeücov's emphasis on forging some "coordination"
among Russian security and intelligence services
demonstrated a planned effort to streamline chekist
organizations, goals, and interests, to the new oligarchy's
benefit.
It is evident that the world is presently being
confronted by a new and forceful espionage offensive
orchestrated by Moscow and currently being carried out by
the products of the former KGB, Russia's corrupt political
leadership, and powerful, organized criminals who now have
well-developed international networks with which to ply
their criminal trade.

These networks currently have the

capêibility to channel anything from stolen shoes to nuclear
weapon components.
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The international community must work to prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons, as instability in a nuclear-armed
state constitutes a global threat, particularly when that
state is controlled by organized crime.

This will prove a

difficult task in the face of the vast differences in
current American and Russian perceptions.

Former Russian

National Security Advisor Aleksandr Lebed exemplified the
point when he responded to ABC News' Ted Koppel's question
regarding US-Russian relations vis-a-vis the safekeeping of
nuclear weapons.

Koppel asked, "Should we worry?"

stated, "We are all products of the cold war.
chekist legacy continues.
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